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 The insurgency in Iraq has continued despite the determination of U.S. and Iraqi 
forces. U.S. counter-insurgent strategy has operated from the premise that the main thrust 
behind anti-U.S. activities is a combination of Sunnis desiring a return to their former 
privileged position and tribal collective actors with long-standing grievances fuelled by 
radical Islam. Yet an analysis incorporating insights from gang theory illuminates the 
diverse, practical, and local motivations of those involved in insurgent networks. Gang 
theory is uniquely suited to illuminate the street-level dynamics that drive insurgent 
violence. Through this, a more precise picture of the relevant networks and their 
operative motivations can be drawn, allowing finer tuned policies targeted to the 
differentiated factors behind non-state violence. I first consider the origins of and 
interactions between the armed groups operating in Iraq for discernable trends in 
development, paying particular attention to factors consistent with gang models. I then 
alter the gang model for the context of Iraq, and present an integrated model that 
articulates the likely effects of state-insurgent interaction on stability and security there. I 
conclude with recommendations demonstrating the model’s relevance for strategic use in 
other regions. 
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1I. INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the post-September 11th world, The United States is confronting an 
international system characterized by new threats and uncertainties. The security posture 
of strategic offense adopted in response guarantees a substantial role for military force 
within this emerging threat environment. Military planners must contend with an 
evolving asymmetrical landscape that differs markedly from the traditional Cold-War era 
paradigm. The danger posed by conventional armies has now been overshadowed by the 
destructive potential of non-traditional actors, a spectre realized in Indonesia, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Madrid, London and Egypt. The perpetrators of these and other attacks 
represent new types of non-state actors that appear in a variety of contexts and in 
increasing numbers. Revolutionary advances in technology are permitting non-state 
forces ranging from computer hackers to terrorist groups and urban gangs to challenge 
the security and sovereignty of modern states. Technology allows these groups to 
exercise disproportionate levels of influence and to pursue objectives that would have 
been unthinkable in previous decades. 
The challenges posed by these violent actors are indicative of the changing 
parameters of warfare. U.S. troops must be prepared to counter these emerging forces 
even as the conventional distinctions between the battlefield and the broader environment 
are becoming blurred. Traditional relationships between combatants, civilian populations, 
and the state are changing in ways that reflect the new unconventional realities of 
conflict. Nowhere is this transformation more apparent than in the ongoing insurgency in 
Iraq. At present, U.S. forces are facing a complex array of interconnected groups from 
across the spectrum of violent actors. Indigenous groups, transnational organizations, and 
a multitude of intermediaries extend the effects of this conflict from the street to the 
global level. Many of these groups are exploiting advanced technology to mobilize and 
sustain operations. New capabilities are augmenting resistance to efforts aimed at 
identifying, targeting, and containing insurgent activities. In spite of the determination of 
U.S. troops and Iraqi forces, insurgent capabilities continue to rise. 
21. Insurgency and Gang Models 
In order to decipher the trajectory and incentives of the Iraqi insurgency, this 
study addresses two main questions. First, how should the insurgency in Iraq be re-
conceptualized in order to better manage insurgent violence in the near term, and to 
further suggest potential evolutionary trajectories for the conflict? At present, our grasp 
of the mechanisms driving insurgent behavior is tenuous at best. Here I seek to develop a 
model that clarifies the factions and loyalties comprising the insurgency, how they relate 
to coalition forces and to the Iraqi state.  
Second, is there a useful conceptual tool for ongoing and potential future 
engagements in the GWOT threat environment? Although operations within Iraq are 
framed as a fundamental aspect of the GWOT, this question relates to the broader context 
of the objectives and end-state of this global campaign. This study seeks to identify the 
crucial strategic components of this environment and the ways in which they interact. 
To address both questions, I examine the developing third generation gang (3G2) 
model introduced by John Sullivan.1 This concept builds on the theory of netwar 
proposed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.2 Netwar theory posits that the 
information revolution has favored networked forms of organization, and that advances in 
communications technology play a larger role in shaping the character and outcomes of 
conflict. Actors adopt more diffuse and dispersed characteristics that give them certain 
advantages in a conflict environment. The 3G2 model stems from the observation that 
urban gangs are well situated to embrace the characteristics of netwar actors. Advanced 
urban gangs capitalize on technological advantages in communications, organization, and 
weaponry to challenge the security and stability of modern states. I test the utility of the 
3G2 model in the present context by comparing the model to the Sunni-led insurgency in 
Iraq. The findings of this comparison are used to build an integrated model, adapting the 
model with innovations for the insurgent context that is presented in Chapter IV.  
                                                 
1 See John P. Sullivan, “Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels and Netwarriors,” Crime and 
Justice International, 13, No. 10, November 1997 and John P. Sullivan “Urban Gangs Evolving as Criminal 
Netwar Actors,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11, No. 1, Spring 2000.  
2 See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy, 12, No. 2, 
1993.  
3This model is used to test two main hypotheses: that an adapted version of the 
3G2 framework is a more realistic way to conceptualize the Sunni-led insurgency than 
the general guidelines currently in use; and that the 3G2 model is a functional 
representation of the evolving GWOT environment, and is a helpful conceptual tool for 
strategic planners. These hypotheses re-frame the rationale guiding U.S. military 
encounters in both Iraq and the secondary theatres of the GWOT. They challenge the 
current employment of U.S. forces and accepted notions of how and why insurgent 
groups mobilize and fight. In the case of Iraq, the existing parameters of U.S. military 
engagement are informed by an incomplete appraisal of the essential factors that are 
shaping the conflict environment. Explanations for insurgent activity have yet to account 
for the societal constructs driving group behavior, offering instead the perception of an 
insurgency that is being perpetuated by a discrete collection of actors harboring 
restorationist ambitions or primordial tribal grievances. Abstracting motives and 
interpreting group behavior through such an outlook omits important attributes that are 
useful for discerning trends in the development of insurgent groups. The economic, 
political, and social relationships propelling interactions between insurgent groups, local 
populations, and the state are left aside, making current assessments of insurgent 
capabilities and probable trajectories of evolution partial and inadequate. 
In contrast to theories favoring tribal grievances and Sunni intransigence, I show 
that the dynamics of the insurgency demonstrate that a complex process of competitive 
interaction is structuring the threat environment in meaningful ways. Far from being 
driven by al Qaeda or uniform anti-Americanism, much of the insurgency has little if 
anything to do directly with the U.S. Relationships between and among indigenous and 
foreign insurgent actors have been conditioned by this competitive calculus. Insurgent 
campaigns have so far revealed shifting patterns of allegiance and loyalties between 
violent groups that are informed by a strategic rationale superseding supposed tribal and 
ideological bonds. These results differ from current assumptions, which expect that 
violent groups with shared ethnic, ideological, or programmatic affinity will positively 
interact to erode the process of stability and reconstruction in Iraq. This process is only 
likely given certain specific conditions, and extrapolating the results of this limited set of 
4circumstances into broad strategic policy will yield negative outcomes, strengthening and 
perpetuating insurgent violence.            
2. Methodology 
Case study analysis is the methodology used in this study. The primary case is the 
Sunni-led insurgency from the beginning of the U.S. invasion until the summer of 2005. 
This case offers the range of criteria needed to adequately test the 3G2 concept, the most 
important of which are: 1) sustained and organized street-level group violence, 2) the 
presence of transnational criminal and terrorist enterprises that seek to establish and 
maintain local street-level relationships, 3) competition among street-level actors, and 4) 
a central state vulnerable to destabilization by the evolving role of street-level groups. 
Sources for this study include criminological and sociological surveys of gang dynamics, 
studies of kinship and interpersonal networks within Iraqi society and government, 
relevant literature detailing the netwar concept and the 3G2 model, press accounts of 
insurgent-counterinsurgent interaction, and primary source accounts of insurgent-
counterinsurgent interaction from the perspective of US counterinsurgency personnel. 
In the rest of this chapter, I establish the parameters of modern low-intensity 
conflict and examine the history of insurgent-counterinsurgent interaction. Prominent 
cases are compared to show the changing characteristics of insurgency from after World 
War Two until the present. I introduce the analytical framework of the thesis and review 
the literature regarding netwar concepts and the 3G2 model. I also survey the literature 
concerning street-level gang dynamics and emphasize the role of violent competition. I 
articulate the theoretical foundation for street-level interaction which will be tested in the 
case study.  
B. INSURGENCY AND GANG THEORY 
Whether termed an insurgency, rebellion, subversion or guerilla war, 
unconventional warfare has been the most common form of violent struggle during the 
twentieth century. The baseline of this spectrum of conflict is subversion, described by 
Kitson as any sustained measure short of armed force employed by one portion of the 
population to overthrow a sitting government, or to coerce a government to act against its 
5will.3 Should one section of the population resort to the sustained use of force against its 
government in the pursuance of the above objectives, then the situation corresponds to 
the definition of insurgency used in this study. Rebellion describes both processes, but 
generally connotes a failed attempt at insurgency, while successful insurgencies are often 
described as “revolutionary.”4 The terms guerilla, partisan, irregular, and paramilitary 
indicate politically nuanced variations of what in practice are combatants engaged in 
some type of unconventional struggle. In this study these terms are used interchangeably.  
In cases where subversion is inadequate or unsuccessful, insurgency in the form 
of sabotage and terrorist violence will erupt, and if insurgent groups are permitted to 
become sufficiently well-armed and numerous (guerillas, irregulars, etc.), to the point of 
challenging the government in open combat and on comparable terms, the conflict has 
evolved into traditional civil war.5 This stage represents the juncture of low and medium-
intensity conflict, where regularized forces contend in open battle in conditions short of 
declared war. All varieties of conflict short of this threshold are considered low-intensity 
(see Figure 1). The high-end of this spectrum is a state of declared, general warfare. The 
thresholds defining each stage of escalation are vague to the point of imperceptibility, a 
characteristic compounded by the tendency of higher-order conflicts such as openly 
declared war to encompass successive dynamics from subversion onward. Because 
insurgency occupies the widest swath of the spectrum short of traditional warfare and 
enjoys the greatest overlap between successive stages of contention, insurgency has 
become the dominant form of violent conflict since the immediate aftermath of World 
War Two when Kitson offered the above formulation.  
                                                 
3 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (Harrisburg, Pa: 
Stackpole Books, 1971), 3. 
4 Maria Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol (Yale University Press, 1995), 8. 
5 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (Harrisburg, Pa: 
Stackpole Books, 1971), 5. 
6 
Figure 1.   Spectrum of Conflict. (After Army FM 7-85, 1-2 and Army Vision 2010 
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1996), 5. 
 
 As the nature of conventional warfare has evolved in the intervening fifty years, 
the characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) have varied accordingly, 
yet contemporary perceptions of insurgency are only beginning to appreciate how the 
effects of the last half-century have altered insurgent behavior.  
For the purpose of this study, a somewhat artificial dichotomy has been 
suggested, whereby insurgencies during the period conforming roughly to the Cold War 
are characterized as “industrial-age,” in order to differentiate between “information-age” 
conflicts discussed in later sections. This emphasis is primarily for analytic purposes, and 
is not intended to suggest that industrial-age insurgencies simply ended with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, or that industrial-age insurgencies do not have qualities also found in 
other periods. In this chapter I first review the literature that details the development of 
industrial-age insurgency and COIN theory. I present the broad strategic themes guiding 
insurgent motivation, mobilization, and the methodology of state response prevalent 
during this period. The second section examines emerging theories of low-intensity 
conflict that describe the changing character of warfare and the role of sub-sate actors in 
the information-age. The first segment reviews the development of netwar theory and 
introduces a framework for analysis informed by structural conditions, political 
opportunities, and mobilization structures. The second segment presents the third 
7generation gang (3G2) model that relates sub-state actors to netwar theory and identifies 
specific trajectories of evolution within an urban context. In the final section of the 
chapter I review relevant aspects of contemporary gang theory, with emphasis on 
mobilization mechanisms and the role of competition at the street-level. 
1. Industrial-Age Insurgency Theory 
The characteristics of industrial-age insurgencies are well documented.  Some 
general themes have been distinguished regarding the conditions in society and catalysts 
for insurgent behavior, insurgent mobilization, and state responses to insurgency that are 
worthy of review. The situations that persisted in the British and French colonial 
periphery as World War Two subsided are instructive, as the campaigns waged in 
Vietnam, Malaya, Kenya, Algeria, and Cyprus exemplify fundamental characteristics of 
industrial-age insurgency. First, these conflicts illustrate nationalist responses to the re-
imposition of a colonial authority that had been weakened in relative terms by the war. 
Second, the political grievances expressed by a particular segment of the population, 
usually in the form of independence from colonial rule, surpassed the limits of what 
colonial governments were prepared to accommodate.6 Metz and Millen note that these 
situations are characteristic of “liberation” insurgency, where insurgents contend against 
a ruling group that is perceived as a foreign occupation by virtue of culture, race, or 
ethnicity. In such cases, the strategy of insurgency has been embraced by majority 
segments of society in addition to marginalized minorities, and has taken the form of 
populist-nationalism as well as Maoist-Marxism.7  
This distinction in the form of insurgency is notable in relation to insurgent 
mobilization and organization. Populist-nationalist movements require no coherent 
ideology or proposed political alternative to motivate a sustained inflow of recruits and 
resources as long as resentment of outside occupation and foreign interference is 
widespread.8 While populist-nationalist movements commonly suggest far-right or fascist 
orientations, in practice this ideal type overlaps with Maoist-Marxism, the twentieth 
                                                 
6 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, “Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict,” RAND Corporation 
(Santa Monica, CA, 1991), 21. 
7 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), < 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ > (July 2005), 8. 
8 Ibid, 24. 
8century’s most widely employed variant of insurgent-based strategy. Indeed, the Maoist 
“People’s War” seems particularly operative when framed by the nationalist rhetoric of a 
liberation insurgency.9 The most definitive characteristic of a People’s War is the 
triangular relationship describing the political and psychological competition between an 
insurgent minority, the government, and the undecided majority population. In this 
model, the undecided majority is the critical center of gravity. Both sides must capture 
this element in order to establish legitimacy and support.10 The success of Maoist 
insurgency not only depends upon its practical ability to sustain operations and support, 
but also on its ability to transition into what Metz and Millen further characterize as 
“national” insurgency upon the defeat of foreign occupation.11 In this regard, the 
principle antagonists are the insurgents and a national government with some degree of 
legitimacy and support, and the primary distinctions between the opposing factions are 
related to political factors such as ideology, economic class, and identity.12 While 
national insurgencies mimic the triangular dynamics of People’s War, a range of actors 
capable of altering the relationship between the antagonists replaces the undecided 
majority, and mobilization becomes correspondingly more difficult. Because the 
insurgents and government generally pursue strategies and tactics that “mirror image”13 
the other, the insurgents must fully develop and apply their political alternative within the 
areas wrested from state control and vigorously attempt to weaken the government by 
capturing popular support. This process was especially evident in Algeria and to a lesser 
extent in Cyprus, although national insurgencies became more prevalent in the late 1960s 
as colonialism declined.  
Britain is most widely credited with the development of comparatively successful 
COIN doctrine, due largely to experience as a colonial power. The situations in British 
Malaya, Kenya, Oman and Cyprus in the 1950s demonstrated that the ambiguous and 
                                                 
9 Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies (London: Routledge, 2001), 70. 
10 Ibid, 74. 
11 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), < 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ > (July 2005), 2. 
12 Ibid, 3. 
13 Ibid, 2. 
9protracted character of liberation insurgency drastically limited the range and 
effectiveness of state response, and that a government must adapt to rapidly evolving 
political and security dynamics in order to succeed.14 In broad terms, Britain often 
confronted segments of a clearly defined minority group that attempted to control the 
population through violence within an ethnically divided society. Insurgents generally 
based their operations within the country rather than in neighboring territories, received 
little or no support from external sources, and waged the bulk of their campaigns away 
from cities.15 Britain’s “Small Wars” doctrine that guided counterinsurgency strategy 
during this period discounted the potential of violent activists to move very far beyond 
terrorism and low-intensity guerilla warfare, while acknowledging that sustained 
“harassment” 16 by insurgent forces might eventually result in strategic success, 
exemplified by events in Algeria. In order to prevent such an outcome, Britain employed 
a program of case-specific responses that advocated the early recognition of an organized 
insurgency, the training and equipping of indigenous forces, use of minimum-force in 
hostile engagements, concentration of administrative, police, and military authority, 
extensive resettlement programs, “hearts and minds” operations, the employment of 
Special Forces and small units where military force was required, and the development of 
long-term political incentives.17  
While this manner of state response contributed to the unequivocal defeat of the 
insurgencies in Malaya and Kenya, the insurgency in Cyprus proved more difficult to 
contain, reduced at great length and cost to an “acceptable level of violence.”18 In many 
ways, the Cyprian case exemplified future trends in industrial-age insurgency. Not only 
was the campaign predominantly focused in highly populated urban centers, but the 
insurgents maintained mass public as well as international support. These factors 
militated against settlement control and the ability to separate the insurgents from the 
population, an integral component of previous successes. The development of indigenous 
                                                 
14 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, “Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict,” RAND 
Corporation (Santa Monica, CA, 1991), 34. 
15 Ibid, 21.  
16 Ibid, 13. 
17 Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies (London: Routledge, 2001), 158. 
18 Ibid, 156. 
10
forces proved impractical, due to the fear of reprisals by insurgents that also inhibited the 
progress of hearts and minds campaigns and required costly infusions of British soldiers, 
dramatically limiting intelligence gathering potential relative to the use of local forces. 
Additionally, the limited political incentives on offer from the British were in no sense 
equal to the prospect of full independence demanded by the insurgents, and the 
subsequent substitution of popular incentives with mass punishment served to further 
legitimize and strengthen the insurgency.19 The ratio of British soldiers to insurgents, 
nearly 20 to 1 in Cyprus as compared to 3 to 1 in Malaya and .4 to 120 in Kenya indicates 
the difficulty of the British position by the end of the 1950s. As such, Cyprus exemplifies 
the evolving role in counterinsurgency of political solutions beyond limited incentives 
intended to preserve the status quo. Also, the role of military force in urban 
counterinsurgency is more clearly identified. Despite an overwhelming military presence 
on the island, a military solution was unattainable. Metz and Millen point out that 
military action most directly targeting insurgents has rarely been strategically decisive 
and tends to further alienate both the public and the international community, while also 
deterring government supporters and inspiring insurgent recruits.21  Further, the Cyprian 
case demonstrates that insurgents can effectively seize and maintain strategic initiative 
due to what Metz and Millen describe as inherently greater flexibility and lack of ethical 
and legal constraints. Lastly, this case illustrates that both protagonists will pursue a 
strategy of retributive violence along similar trajectories as long as victory seems 
attainable through such means and the costs of continuing a violent campaign are less 
than the costs of pursuing an alternate strategy.22   
The cases of the Italian Red Brigades and Argentine Montoneros demonstrate that 
national insurgencies are vulnerable to similar methods of state response initially 
witnessed in the liberation insurgencies of Malaya, Kenya, and in Cyprus to a lesser 
                                                 
19 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, “Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict,” RAND 
Corporation (Santa Monica, CA, 1991), 18. 
20 Ibid, 38. 
21 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), < 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ > (July 2005), 9. 
22 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004), < 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ > (July 2005), 14. 
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extent, although important distinctions in counterinsurgency strategy as applied to each 
period can be identified. The Italian and Argentine cases both reflected the characteristics 
of national insurgencies rather than the liberation insurgencies of the early 1960s, 
although the Argentine Montoneros and the Italian Red Brigades to a lesser degree both 
framed their violent campaigns in terms of liberation from a foreign-dominated system of 
government. The divergent characteristics of state response that in both cases 
successfully subdued insurgent violence demonstrate the utility of military and law 
enforcement approaches in relation to the evolving nature of insurgent behavior. For 
instance, the Italian Carabinieri were able to exploit interpersonal links between the legal 
Communist Party of Italy and the members of underground insurgent groups. This 
permitted the Carabinieri to conduct a national counterinsurgency campaign based on the 
traditional law-enforcement minimum-force paradigm, whereby the military, intelligence, 
and administration functions were centralized and the regular military supported law-
enforcement as needed, much like in Malaya, Kenya, and when possible in Cyprus.23 In 
contrast, the Argentine government relied on a war paradigm that mobilized the military 
and security apparatus against whole segments of the population, such that by the mid to 
late 1970s, a concentrated and comprehensive policy of state repression successfully 
neutralized the Montonero threat.24 Unlike the Italian case, the negative externalities of 
the Argentine response in terms of long-term social and political ramifications suggest 
that a war paradigm is generally unsuited to the conditions of contemporary insurgency, 
especially if waged by a modern, liberal democratic state.25  
While differing in methods, the Argentine and Italian responses both highlight the 
amplification of characteristics that impeded British counterinsurgency efforts in Cyprus, 
including an almost exclusively urban-orientation, considerable trans-border 
connectivity, and substantial domestic as well as international support for the insurgent 
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campaign, more so in the case of the Red Brigades.26 The predominantly urban focus of 
insurgency in this period may be partially explained by dramatically increasing rates of 
urbanization in recent decades, particularly in the developing world. By the year 2000, 
the developing world accounted for sixty-eight percent of the global urban-dwelling 
population,27 and demographic trends indicate that this rate will increase. Simply put, 
insurgency occurs where the people are, suggesting that urban insurgency will likely be 
the dominant form of sub-national violence in the future.  
The significance of the move to cities is partially apparent in the difficulties 
industrial-age armies have experienced in recent counterinsurgency campaigns, including 
Panama City, Kuwait City, Mogadishu, Port-au-Prince, Grozny, Sarajevo, Palestine, and 
now Baghdad. Contemporary urban insurgency, particularly in recent US experience 
often conforms to Krulak’s “3-Block” model, wherein counterinsurgency forces can be 
expected to perform humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, and “highly lethal 
mid-intensity battle” all within the close confines of a few city blocks.28 The 
corresponding deceleration and indecisiveness of military operations, use of 
asymmetrical and low-tech methodology, and high casualty rates29 that characterize 
contemporary urban engagements reintroduces the protractedness and ambiguity of 
classic industrial-age insurgency while mitigating the advantages of industrial-age urban 
counterinsurgency strategy. 
Additionally, the move to cities has markedly affected the dynamics of insurgent 
mobilization, due in part to basic proximity, but more importantly as a result of increased 
access to information technology (IT). As the information revolution proliferates globally 
and the “digital divide” narrows in the developing world, the availability of advanced 
communications technologies to insurgent forces will increase. One prominent theory 
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that seeks to identify the relationships between contemporary sub-national conflict and 
the spread of the information revolution was first introduced in 1993, and has been 
termed “netwar.” 
2. Information-Age Insurgency Theory 
Netwar theory maintains that the information revolution has dramatically altered 
the nature of conflict, such that much of the industrial-age model must be 
reconceptualized in order to reflect the emerging realities of the information-age. The 
theory posits that the information revolution has privileged networked forms of 
organization and a more decisive role of information and communications in the conduct 
and conclusion of conflicts.30 Further, the theory states that the characteristics of 
information-age protagonists differ markedly from their industrial-age counterparts in 
terms of more “diffuse, dispersed, multidimensional, nonlinear, and ambiguous” 
characteristics.31 These qualities are shared in the two facets of netwar theory, relating 
first to properties of social activism, militant and otherwise, generally viewed as a 
promising element for societies, and second to criminal and terrorist groups waging some 
variety of sub-national or non-state struggle short of conventional warfare.32 This study is 
focused primarily on the latter aspect, the most important characteristics of which are 
distinguished by structural conditions, political opportunities, and mobilization structures. 
Structural conditions refer to the configuration of objective circumstances in 
society affecting the development and orientation of insurgent activity. For the purposes 
of this study, structures include the socio-economic and political stratification that 
generally form the basis of expressed grievances, as in the cases of national versus 
liberation insurgency articulated in the previous section. Although netwar theory 
indirectly addresses structure in this traditional sense, two aspects of the model are 
noteworthy in this regard. Netwar presupposes a wide range of competition at the societal 
level waged by complex, dense, cascading structures consisting of overlapping networks 
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that transcend different societal strata and vary regarding levels of exclusivity.33  As 
such, a primary structural precondition outlined by the theory is the existence of an array 
of associative networks engaged in competition within a society, typically against the 
state.34 Informing this view of the necessity of social networks is the assumption that the 
information revolution favors networked structures. In this sense, the second structural 
precondition relates to information-age capabilities. Netwar requires that potential sub-
national protagonists have access to information technology on a general level, the so-
called “democratization” of IT, in addition to a high degree of technological proficiency, 
particularly regarding communications.35 
Netwar theory also considers the interactions between the protagonists and the 
wider environment in relation to how these interactions change and how such changes 
affect the behavior of the protagonists, outcomes described by Tilly as political 
opportunities.36 Conventional examples of political opportunities include a state’s 
reduced capacity or penchant for repression, the relative openness of the institutional 
political system, and relationships to and among the elite establishment, all of which 
represent opportunities to increase the accessibility of the political sphere. Such 
opportunities partially determine the form and timing of the netwar protagonists’ efforts37 
and are particularly apparent in two related aspects: the structure of state response, and 
the availability of havens. The netwar model emphasizes that most states are comprised 
of large, centralizing, bureaucratic establishments composed of institutional hierarchies 
that prefer to act alone when possible.38 These characteristics limit a state’s effectiveness 
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when confronted by networked adversaries that tend to combine segments of small, 
dispersed organizations acting relatively autonomously but with coordination and shared 
intent.39 The capacity of most traditional hierarchical instruments of state power to 
detect, target, and repress networked adversaries in a coherent and effective way has been 
low, as the persistence of networked protagonists ranging from Columbia to Central Asia 
exemplifies. In this way, networked actors can exploit openings within relatively 
controlled political space where hierarchies may be slow or unable to respond.  Should a 
state become more effective at repressing networked adversaries, the availability of 
havens becomes proportionally more critical. Havens are defined by Fantasia and Hirsch 
as spaces safe from harassment and surveillance that foster oppositional culture and 
group solidarity.40 As networked structures often overlap and interconnect in ways that 
easily transcend barriers such as national boundaries, the ability of diffuse netwar actors 
to exploit a range of havens simultaneously prolongs the effectiveness of their campaign. 
In practical terms, a haven provides the political space necessary for further 
mobilization, what Tilly describes as the process used by an organization to gain 
collective control over the resources needed for action.41 The mechanisms that groups 
develop in order to acquire these resources for operations over sustained periods have 
been termed mobilization structures.42 Netwar identifies two principal components of 
mobilization structures: organizational design, and external connectivity. Organizational 
design refers to the form and functions of an organization’s structure. For instance, the 
principal role of communications in networked organization has been noted, including all 
manner of interaction from advanced technology to basic interpersonal contact. While 
netwar articulates certain technological and social dynamics for optimal communication 
capacity, the most prominent functional aspects in this regard relate to the structural 
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design of the organization.43 Industrial-age non-state protagonists generally embraced 
formal, hierarchically-based, functionally exclusive organizations similar to the state 
institutions that they were contending against.44 Insurgent efforts ranging in time and 
location from Argentina to Cyprus exemplify the proliferation of the concentrated 
Leninist organizational form. In contrast, information-age protagonists have no such 
precise horizontal and vertical reporting relationships that govern the flow of 
communications, coordination, command, and control. There is no central leadership or 
single headquarters where command capabilities might be targeted. Centralized decision-
making gives way to mutual consultation and local-level initiative, enhancing the 
flexibility and adaptability of the organization.45  
These properties vary according to the organizational form adapted. Networked 
protagonists are known to adopt variations and combinations of three principal designs:46 
the chain design, where actors interact sequentially within limited channels; the hub 
design, where interactions between groups of actors are channeled through a central core; 
and the all-channel design, where interactions are constant and flow to and from each 
actor in the organization. The relatively flat all-channel design is the ideal structure in 
terms of communication, although in practice most groups adopt combinations of the 
three designs for task efficiency, such as an all-channel design at the core of a group and 
a chain design for executing decisions at the periphery.47  
One important feature in each design is the role of leadership. In the absence of a 
centralized structure, leadership is often dispersed throughout the organization, a property 
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contributing to the resiliency of networks to counter-leadership strikes.48 Despite such 
dispersion, doctrine and strategy are functions of centralized decision-making, such that 
commonality of purpose is maintained when different segments of the organization act 
autonomously.49 An additional feature of the network form is the quality of the 
associative connections that enable the internal and external links comprising the 
internetted structure. It is argued that successful netwar actors generally superimpose 
advanced communications and organizational forms over pre-existing social networks, 
capped by coherent doctrines, strategies, and narratives.50 Associative networks, be they 
kinship or clan based, occupational, or religious in nature are portrayed as pre-tooled 
cultural repositories reflecting the stratification of society. As such, social networks 
exhibit varying degrees of shared norms, values, and reciprocal trust51 depending on the 
exclusivity of a particular social sphere. For example, family, clan, or religious groups 
tend toward exclusivity, while social ties based on shared occupation or political 
affiliation are generally more inclusive. In netwar, the exclusivity of the organization’s 
social structure is a key property for ensuring information security and resisting outside 
penetration. Conversely, the most inclusive structures are more appropriate for the all-
channel optimization of information flow, and savvy netwar actors overlap these two 
types at critical junctures in order to affect a desirable balance.52 
The properties of associative networks also relate to the second element of 
network mobilization structures, referring to the establishment and maintenance of 
numerous links to external entities, especially other netwar actors, although the range of 
potential contacts is limited only by the availability of communications resources. This 
property is termed connectivity and deviates from industrial-age models of the life-cycle 
of an insurgency. These models describe a phased-progression of organization, terrorism, 
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guerilla warfare, and ultimately mobile or conventional war against the sate.53 This 
process requires steadily increasing amounts of active and passive popular support, 
culminating in some form of popular revolutionary structure should the insurgency 
succeed in toppling a national government. In contrast, information-age actors are more 
likely to explore alternative methods of financing and acquiring war materiel in the 
organization-phase that diminish the necessity of active mass public support in later 
stages. While T.E. Lawrence famously observed a similar property of industrial age 
insurgency, noting that only two-percent of a population was required to actively support 
an insurgency,54 this calculation did not account for the support of an interested state 
sponsor, such as Great Britain, in the insurgent effort. This dynamic was replicated with 
increasing frequency during the national insurgencies in the latter half of the Cold War.  
Conversely, contemporary insurgent groups are increasingly likely to cultivate 
relationships at the sub-national level, replacing overt state sponsorship with ties to non-
state actors such as violent transnational enterprises (VTEs). These groups provide access 
to alternative markets and resources such that insurgent groups require only the passivity 
of a population in circumstances short of orthodox civil war.55 Contemporary VTEs are 
highlighted as evolving practitioners of netwar concepts, forming spontaneously in order 
to exploit emerging market trends or created and directed by a core of actors in pursuit of 
specific objectives.56 The term “enterprises” has been chosen to draw a distinction 
between the more common traditional criminal organizations (TCOs) that in customary 
usage refers to traditional, hierarchically-structured organized crime groups, mafias and 
the like. These groups are driven by profit and are rooted in the local setting, although 
much of their activity entails cross-border interactions with affiliates in neighboring 
states. The term VTE refers to segments of the broad stratum of violent non-state actors 
that are beginning to adopt information-age organization and behavior, and also includes 
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the emerging class of transnational terrorist actors. These groups are driven by political 
motives, based internationally, and exhibit the dispersed properties of assets and 
leadership that are characteristic of netwar actors.57 VTEs maintain global reach and 
capabilities through a complex structure of affiliates and overlapping networks. These 
properties allow VTEs to pursue specific political interests in a wide variety of 
geographic and political settings. 
3. The Third-Generation Gang Model 
The third generation gang model stems from netwar theory, and was developed in 
the late 1990s in response to emerging trends in the American drug trade. Investigators 
increasingly identified links between transnational distribution networks based in Latin 
America and street-level gangs based in the United States, and began to question the 
potential of certain groups such as urban gangs to embrace characteristics of netwar 
actors, especially in relation to networked organizational structure and behavior and the 
use of advanced IT and communications. The street-level designation refers to the degree 
of interaction that is rooted in and is most consequential to the local setting. Street-level 
groups are those that are oriented and engaged locally through associational ties, 
resources, and allegiance. The street-level group represents the lowest echelon of the 
continuum of actors examined in this study, with transnational or global actors occupying 
the highest level. A transnational or sub-state actor may also engage at the street-level, 
however they are not considered a street-level group unless their orientation is narrowly 
focused and rooted in the local setting. The terms “street-level” and “local-level” are used 
interchangeably. One concept gradually taking shape describes a three-phase progression 
of street-level gangs into criminal netwar actors. This “third generation gang” (3G2) 
model adds new context and trajectories of group evolution onto the netwar framework 
by considering the nature of street-level gang-VTE interaction and the potential effects on 
state stability and security. The term 3G2 applies to a particular group or organization in 
addition to the progression of street-level gangs from small, territorial, opportunistic 
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collectives into more sophisticated, internationalized, commercial and political 
enterprises.58  
The foundation of this process is known as the first generation form, characterized 
by individual, opportunistic criminal activity loosely organized and led, resembling a 
traditional clan or family structure and based on loyalty and territorial protection (see 
figure 2 below).59 This focus on territory and localism is replaced by market awareness, 
as second-generation gangs evolve from opportunism to entrepreneurial drug-centered 
enterprises, the stage of development most commonly associated with contemporary 
gangs.60 Entrepreneurial drug gangs are rigidly structured organizations that are often 
confused with traditional organized crime, due in large part to similar motivations for the 
use of extreme violence. The issue is further confused by the mutual interests drug 
distribution organizations share with second-generation gangs regarding market 
presence.61 Competition and protection of markets drive second-generation gangs toward 
ever-increasing levels of violence and technological acquisition, facilitated through 
interactions with international supply and distribution cartels.62 The final evolutionary 
form, the 3G2 itself, is an ultra-politicized criminal netwar enterprise, operating 
internationally and combining elements of the first two forms but with substantially 
greater sophistication.63 
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Figure 2.   Evolving Characteristics of Street-gangs (From John Sullivan, “Gangs, 
Hooligans, and Anarchists- the Vanguard of Netwar in the Streets,” in John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars The Future of Terror, 
Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-880-OSD/RC, 2001), 
103.) 
The outcomes of this progression are the control by 3G2 actors of enclaves or 
para-states within a targeted country, or the direct or indirect control of a targeted state 
through the establishment of a criminal-state.64 As an adaptation of netwar theory, these 
trajectories are informed by many of the same premises, with some notable innovations. 
In terms of structural conditions, the 3G2 framework places the array of associative 
networks and availability of usable technology within the context of states that are 
constrained by minimal capacity, poor economic performance, and measurable social and 
political disparities.65 This combination of factors presents a broad range of political 
opportunities for aspiring 3G2 actors to consolidate or expand their political ambitions, 
including: increases in corruptible urban enclaves that weaken legitimate political 
centers; declining security capabilities that constrain state response; and conflicts 
between and within the traditional elite establishment as status quo power-sharing 
arrangements begin to crumble. Given the particular advantages of networked actors in 
terms of mobilization capacity, it is argued that evolving street-level gangs are likely to 
exploit each of these opportunities in the pursuance of the lawless enclaves or criminal-
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states described above. This capacity is driven by access to valuable information and 
exchange relationships via predominantly underground channels. According to the 
model, underground criminal organizations and VTEs will form loose alliances with one 
another, with smaller criminal enterprises, and with insurgent movements on an ad-hoc, 
task specific basis.66 This enables evolving street-level contenders to acquire specific 
resources such as advanced weaponry and communications, as well as financial 
opportunities and infrastructure through existing smuggling and distribution networks 
maintained by VTEs.  
Such a relationship integrates several levels of analysis, spanning from the street-
level actor to the global realm, and is a defining feature of the 3G2 model. Interactions 
between VTEs and street-level contenders are described in terms of a labor-management 
relationship, whereby the VTE maintains the capital resources, i.e. advanced IT and 
communications expertise, wholesale supplies of illicit and licit resources, and access to 
global markets, and the street-level gang furnishes human resources for the distribution of 
goods and provision of services.67 Services include contract killing, physical protection 
of assets, and information gathering.68 A confluence of interests is thought to exist such 
that both parties seek to erode the effective sovereignty of the nation-state, ousting or 
manipulating the government of a country or a segment of the country.69  
Equally damaging is the ability of an evolving 3G2 actor to maintain links to 
legitimate institutions within society, such as the political establishment, law 
enforcement, and the judiciary. A subtle process of corruption and intimidation is thought 
to work in tandem with more overt, violent methods to neutralize institutional barriers 
and assert de facto political control over a limited domain. As a series of small conquests 
develops into an integrated network, it is thought that 3G2 actors would eventually be in 
a position to dominate an entire nation state.70 Through such a process, a street-gang may 
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evolve from a violent, street-level entity exploiting a failed community into a 
sophisticated, politically motivated enterprise with international reach, and structured to 
maximize technological and interpersonal resources. 
4. Gang Theory 
Gang theory articulates in greater detail the processes of street-level interaction 
that inform much of the 3G2 concept. The relevance of gang theory to contemporary 
insurgency may seem questionable to some. In the American tradition in particular, it is 
commonly accepted that the origins, development, and proliferation of criminal gangs 
represents an entirely different type of process than that associated with the appearance of 
insurgent groups.71 Gang members are, after all, typically criminals and as such suggest a 
law-enforcement based response. Conversely, insurgents challenge the legitimacy and 
authority of a state through the use of military-style tactics, and thus represent a military 
threat to be dealt with in kind. Insurgent violence is an issue of national security and 
sovereignty, while street-crime is the domain of municipal police. Closer inspection 
reveals that in spite of these ostensible differences, street-gangs and insurgent groups are 
more closely linked than is commonly thought. Both groups occupy positions on a 
continuum of non-state actors that rely on violence as the primary means of obtaining 
their objectives.72 The urban focus of contemporary insurgency makes this correlation 
even more pronounced. Gang theory investigates the relationships between grievances, 
social structures, mobilization, violence, and the enforcement mechanisms of the state 
that confront each actor within an urban context, including insurgent groups. The 
particular relevance of gang-theory now is that gang behavior is changing in certain 
discernable ways that may provide a useful way to conceptualize likely patterns of 
insurgent-group development in similar urban environments. 
 Common themes explored by recent contributions to gang literature have been 
the diversity and complexity of contemporary street gangs and their general tendency to 
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defy convention.73 To date, the literature has not developed an exhaustive or mutually 
agreed upon definition of a “gang.” For the purposes of this study, the term “gang” will 
refer to a formal street-level collective that views its main purpose as providing social 
and economic benefits to its members and its community.74 Established street gangs such 
as Chicago’s Gangster Disciples and Latin Kings, and Los Angeles’ 18th Street are 
comprised of tens of thousands of members from divergent geographic and ethnic 
backgrounds that invariably affect the form, motivations, and methods that characterize 
their organizational dynamics and interactions with wider society, particularly with 
regard to relationships with law enforcement and other elements of the state.  
Gang theory emphasizes the role of structural conditions within a society in terms 
analogous to netwar theory and the 3G2 model. Gang theory highlights the decaying 
social structure of contemporary urban life as a principal contributor to the formation and 
proliferation of modern street-level gangs. Studies conducted mainly in the United States 
consider the effects of dramatic socio-economic dislocation, decreasing urban tax bases, 
and declines in public sector investment. These factors combine with steady influxes of 
migrants to result in masses of newly arrived and unemployed, populating deteriorating 
neighborhoods with little economic or physical security.75 Such an environment 
reinforces the role of associative networks for survival, furnishing street-level groups 
ample political opportunity by formalizing their role as cultural repositories of the 
solidarity, protection, and economic mobility in low-income neighborhoods.76  
a. Street-Level Mobilization  
           Gang theory emphasizes that in order for street-gangs to sustain or enlarge 
this role, mobilization structures broadly defined by organizational form and external 
links to wider society must be effective. The two factors influencing the organizational 
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model that street gangs will adopt are the gang’s short and long-term goals, and the 
economic, social, and political conditions in which gangs must operate.77  Similar to 
netwar actors, street-gangs adopt different combinations of organizational forms 
depending on the existence of threats and/or opportunities. The three ideal-type models 
that gangs are known to employ are the top-down, hierarchical form, the 
horizontal/consultative form, and the all-channel/influential form. The hierarchical form 
has a traditional vertical structure with clearly defined channels of authority and 
responsibility. This design typically indicates that the viability of a gang relies on 
generating large sums of money for collective use, as the intensity of urban competition 
for markets and territory demands relatively strict oversight and control of resources.78 
The horizontal/consultative design distributes power equally, with interchangeable roles 
and consensus-based decision making, and the all-channel/influential form is 
characterized by a small core of dedicated members who share authority and direct the 
operations of the gang based on mutual interest.79 Although the horizontal and influential 
forms exhibit the greatest similarities to netwar-type constructs, the most powerful and 
sophisticated street-level gangs tend to rely on variations of the vertical design.80       
The design adopted also affects the capability of a street gang to 
effectively maintain links to wider society. Theory suggests that street-level collective 
interaction with wider society takes place on three levels: with the community, social 
service institutions, and law enforcement.81 Jankowski describes gang-community 
interaction as a functional association based on a number of “exchange relationships”82 in 
which the organization and the community provide reciprocal services. This relationship 
is the pivotal element of the street-gang mobilization structure, as the community 
provides (or denies) the integral political space for organizational development. Not only 
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is the local community the primary source of gang-member recruitment, it also represents 
the communications, surveillance, and information infrastructure necessary for operations 
against competing organizations.83  
At the street-level, strong community affiliation is also recognized as a 
critical component of the organization’s defensive capabilities, providing the necessary 
haven as outlined above, while also acting as the primary legitimizer of the organization’s 
existence.84 The benefits received by the street-gang are only one side of the exchange, 
whereby the community expresses an expectation of reciprocity, generally in the forms of 
protection and access to resources.85 The latter commodity is a function of both the 
organization’s financial success in entrepreneurial markets, and more importantly on the 
interactions between the organization and social service agencies of the state. Jankowski 
observes that state agencies and street-gangs develop a kind of symbiotic 
interpenetration.86 He suggests that the momentum of bureaucratic expansion drives 
social service agents to best serve their segment of the community, while the street-gangs 
focus any available social service resources toward their community of interest. As such, 
both parties are keen to facilitate an ever expanding relationship. A similar dynamic, 
although at an appreciably lower level, describes street-gang interaction with law 
enforcement. In many respects, law enforcement is eager to establish contacts within the 
organization in order to break the otherwise substantial entry barriers of secrecy and 
community non-cooperation. Barrios describes routine exchanges of information between 
gang leadership and law enforcement, and police attempt to exploit any interaction by 
cultivating informers and extracting information about the gang and its rivals.87 
Additionally, street gangs are known to pursue formal contacts with local elected 
officials, although on a less frequent basis. Jankowski observes that gangs in New York 
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and Boston were able to establish consistent, direct ties to high level municipal officials 
and elected politicians.88 As at the community level, exchange relationships are formed, 
typically some variety of “get out the vote” effort performed by the gang in exchange for 
monetary rewards or access to other resources.89 Additionally, street organizations may 
attempt to leverage political contacts during periods of unusually intense law 
enforcement pressure, although the outcomes of these efforts are variable.90 
 b. Competition and Truce-Making 
            Gang theory also identifies trends in street-level competition and truce-
making. Competition in and of itself is the sine qua non of street-gang development. 
Competition structures the formal role that street-gangs fulfill in low-income areas. Even 
in traditional kinship-based or first-generation gangs, competition for prestige and 
territory drives many aspects of group activity.91 According to Jankowski’s model of 
gang behavior, street gangs view all other street-level organizations as predatory 
competitors,92 including law enforcement. Street-level competition takes several forms. 
Gangs routinely compete for territory, markets, distribution rights, prestige, and a range 
of other resources, and the primary means of competition at the street-level is small-
group violence.  
Street-gangs will initiate hostilities as an organization against other street-
level contenders when either the economic calculus weighs in favor of doing so, even in 
cases when the targeted group is not a rival, or when the internal dynamic of the gang is 
destabilized or distressed.93 Competition at this level is a lengthy, iterative process of 
low-level retributive violence that a typical street-gang is capable of sustaining until 
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victory or self-exhaustion.94 Findings indicate that in most cases, the gang that first 
initiates hostilities will ultimately succeed against a targeted group.95 As such, pre-
emption is the prevailing strategic rationale that guides gang competition. While inter-
gang disputes are known for their extreme violence, the overwhelming majority of gang-
related violence is perpetrated by individual gang-members outside of the organizational 
context.96 In these cases, organizational violence between gangs is motivated by 
vendetta, in addition to the standard dynamics of competition. Such competitive hostility 
between gangs is known to rapidly escalate, characterized by the introduction of 
advanced weaponry to include military-grade high explosives, car-bombs, and rocket 
launchers.97  
Competitive interaction with law enforcement adopts a similar form. 
Gangs are known to target law enforcement following periods of intensified police 
pressure, and will sustain low-level violence until encroachment subsides.98 As such, 
street-level gangs will adopt a posture of violent offense tactically while on the defensive 
strategically. This tendency is due to the effects of violent confrontation on the internal 
dynamics of street gangs. Even in cases of rigidly-structured hierarchical gangs, periods 
of intense pressure produce a decentralizing effect, shifting organizational forms toward 
the horizontal/consultative type of structure until levels of pressure decline.99 This type of 
decentralization loosens the degree of collective control that gang-leadership can exercise 
over the rank-and-file, in addition to compelling the most violent and extreme elements 
from within the gang into positions of greater prominence.100 Emerging elements can 
then pose a direct challenge to existing leadership for control of gang resources, or bolt 
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with the most extreme faction to form a rival organization.101 In all cases, structural 
decentralization yields a net increase in the overall level of violence.      
When the extreme violence of street-level competition reaches a level 
unacceptable to members of the community, hinders market access and efficiency, or 
threatens the organizational survival of the protagonists, efforts to effect a truce 
settlement will succeed.102 Repeated damage to community property or victimization of 
community members will rapidly reduce levels of community support, an essential pillar 
of the street-level mobilization structure. In general terms, repeated acts of violence 
against community members indicate the beginning stages of organizational instability 
and eventual decline.103 Without the havens, resources, and recruits afforded by solid 
community relations, street-gangs are unsustainable organizationally. If threatened in this 
manner, or confronted by mutual existential threats such as the rise of a third-party 
contender, the protagonists will seek a comprehensive truce. According to Hayden, 
expanded law enforcement presence within a conflict zone indirectly affects this process 
by interrupting illicit transactions, thereby enhancing the economic incentives to 
normalize relations.104 Yet broadly speaking, the dynamics of truce making are internal 
functions driven by the relationships between the street-level groups and the communities 
needed as bases of support.     
C. CONCLUSIONS 
In consideration of the preceding sections, some general themes regarding the 
evolution of insurgency and low-intensity conflict are apparent. First, the qualities of 
contemporary insurgency suggest a departure from the industrial-age model of conflict 
toward an emerging brand of low-intensity conflict that is predominantly urban-oriented 
and characterized by information-age concepts of strategy and design. The industrial-age 
model of conflict dictates the following features for a successful counter-insurgency 
strategy: 
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• The early recognition of an insurgency is essential 
• Administrative, police, and military authority should be concentrated and 
coordinated.  
• Sufficient long-term political incentives and social reforms must be 
developed  
• Policing is primary over military operations, and the use of minimum-
force in hostile engagements is preferable  
• Special Forces and small units should be employment where military force 
is required  
• Indigenous security forces should be well trained and equipped 
• “Hearts and minds programs” should be established 
• The insurgency should be physically separated of from the population 
• Cross-border links and transnational access should be disrupted 
• International public opinion should be pacified  
Conversely, the information-age model suggests that “hearts and minds 
programs” and the physical separation of insurgents from the population are unsuited to 
the emerging environment of urban-centric insurgency. These factors are overshadowed 
by the tasks of disrupting information technology and communications infrastructures, 
transnational connectivity, and shaping international public opinion. The remaining tenets 
of industrial-age counterinsurgency theory are consistent with the transition to an 
information-age model. 
Second, conflict in the information-age will likely involve greater interaction 
between insurgents and other groups, especially VTEs, than in the past. These links 
effectively extend the scope of low-intensity conflict from the street-level to the 
international and global realm, impacting the dynamics of insurgent violence. The 3G2 
model posits that these emerging trends in information-age conflict are already affecting 
the development and orientation of street-gangs in certain discernable ways. As both 
insurgent groups and street-gangs confront similar structural conditions, opportunities for 
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political expansion, and mobilization challenges within a predominantly urban context, a 
solid foundation exists for comparison between these two types of groups. 
D. PLAN OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II evaluates the Sunni-led insurgency from the beginning of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom until the summer of 2005. I consider the origins of and interactions 
between the armed groups operating in Iraq for discernable trends in development that 
are consistent with the 3G2 model. This chapter identifies the most prominent insurgent 
actors during each phase of the insurgency, and investigates why they continue to attract 
support. I also investigate what opportunities have permitted insurgent groups to gain 
political prominence, and what constraints have halted or reversed this process. I then 
examine how insurgent groups are mobilizing to sustain their operations and support 
base, and identify the relationships between the most prominent actors. Lastly, I consider 
how competition between armed groups is affecting inter-group relationships and levels 
of insurgent violence     
Chapter III considers modifications to the 3G2 concept resulting from the Iraq 
case study in Chapter II, in addition to assessing the utility of an adapted 3G2 framework 
to the wider GWOT architecture outside of Iraq. I investigate those areas of the 3G2 
model that are inadequately considered, and propose refinements based on the results of 
the Iraq case study. The output of this chapter is an integrated 3G2 model that reflects the 
most current assessments of the patterns and underlying dynamics of insurgent violence. I 
then discuss the applicability of this model in GWOT operations outside of Iraq, framing 
the relevance of the model for strategic use. 
In Chapter IV, I review the findings of the study and assess the validity of 
alternative hypotheses for the Iraqi insurgency. I consider the evolving role of force in 
COIN strategy and the changing parameters of insurgency in the information age. The 
lessons from the Iraq case findings are reviewed and the existing 3G2 model is compared 
to the integrated model presented in Chapter III. I discuss proposals for action based on 
the results of this study, and highlight areas for further inquiry that may broaden our 




























II. CASE STUDY OF THE IRAQ INSURGENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the case study of the ongoing insurgency in Iraq in order to 
assess the utility of the 3G2 concept in the contemporary threat environment. 
Specifically, this chapter investigates the genesis of and interactions between the armed 
groups operating in Iraq to discover trends consistent with those predicted by the 3G2 
model. I examine the insurgency within the timeframe from the U.S. invasion in March 
of 2003 to the present. According to U.S. Central Command, during this period the two 
most challenging areas for street-level insurgent violence have been western Baghdad 
and al Anbar province, both predominantly Sunni areas. As such, the focus of analysis 
will follow relevant aspects of the insurgency and examine Sunni participation 
exclusively. Additionally, the insurgency is considered in terms of its constituent 
elements rather than as an aggregate whole. This method disaggregates the properties of 
the disparate groups which contribute to insurgent violence in order to provide a clear 
assessment of relevant forces and their effects.  
The investigation of these groups entails how and where they originated, the 
conditions that have facilitated their expansion, their current role within the local setting, 
and the effects of this local presence on the degree of Sunni-led violence. The first 
section of this chapter considers the prevailing socio-economic structures over time and 
their role in the genesis of insurgent violence. Specifically, patterns of social cohesion 
and resource scarcity are considered in relation to the declining capacity of the Iraqi state. 
The second section explores the type and timing of opportunities that have facilitated the 
expansion of insurgent groups locally. The third section examines how these groups 
mobilize to sustain operations, emphasizing the role of organizational structure and 
connectivity to the broader environment. The last section considers the nature of the 
relationships between different types of insurgent groups, and how the logic of such 
interaction is affecting the developing threat environment.   
B. STRUCTURAL CONDITONS 
Structural conditions within Iraqi society have partially determined the 
characteristics of insurgent behavior. This is particularly true regarding the role of 
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informal networks and kinship affiliation in state development, and patterns of resource 
distribution and scarcity. Both are prominent and well-known components of Saddam 
Hussein’s survival strategy during the latter period of Ba’th Party rule, and are rooted in 
the dynamics of competition and development dating as far back as the 1920 insurgency 
against British colonial authority.105 The ostensible similarities between that period and 
contemporary events sometimes obscure relevant societal changes that have transpired 
during the intervening eighty years. Important aspects of this transformation include high 
rates of population growth and large scale urbanization beginning in the late 1950s. Over 
the duration of Ba’th rule, urban population growth outpaced growth in rural areas by 
more than two-hundred percent, giving some indication of the pace and magnitude of 
change.106 Such demographic pressures profoundly affected traditional forms of social 
and political organization, processes that coincided with the rise of the Iraqi Ba’th and 
bear the imprint of party efforts to consolidate state authority over thirty years of rule. 
This section considers the effects of state development and consolidation on patterns of 
social cohesion and resource scarcity from the early period of Ba’th rule until the present. 
The first segment demonstrates how traditional modes of kinship affiliation were 
appropriated by a weakened Ba’th regime, and how this altered type of association 
became the prevailing social mechanism at the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003. The 
second segment explores the Hussein regime’s calculus of resource distribution, 
highlighting the economic parameters that complemented changes in social structure. The 
final segment evaluates the role of kinship affiliation and resource scarcity following the 
U.S. invasion until the present. 
1. The Role of Informal Networks in State Development 
The local-level prominence of tribal and sub-tribal networks is one notable 
outcome of the Ba’th drive toward consolidation. Philip Khoury 107 describes the 
traditional or pre-Ba’th form of social and political organization as “cultural tribalism,” 
whereby a tribe constituted a territorially-defined political entity that organized 
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fragmented rural populations of small familial, ethnic, client, or ad hoc groups into a 
political “chieftaincy.” While genealogical factors had organizational significance 
locally, tribes were primarily the creations of political elites wherein familial, ethnic, or 
lineage ties were insignificant to the broader organization. In this sense, a loose tribal 
ideology of kinship may have existed, but the reality of tribal organization and 
association was based on shared interest, mutual advantage, and service.108 As 
demographic pressures mounted, the informal associational ties of cultural tribalism were 
formalized, although according to new and in some cases unrecognizable patterns. The 
alienation, hostility, and insecurity that accompanied rural-urban migration were 
compounded by the need to compete within and manage the stresses of a rapidly 
changing and unfamiliar environment.109 As migrants established links through local, 
often extended familial or clan channels for resources and support, connectivity with 
traditional tribal political centers became more tenuous, being officially severed by the 
emerging Ba’th leadership in the mid 1970s.110 As a consequence, new forms of locally-
delineated political and social cohesion developed in urban areas based wholly or in part 
on lineage solidarity, such that at this level, political arrangements preserved tribal 
solidarity, and sub-tribal elements such as clan or extended family became 
predominant.111 In this way, Ba’th party efforts to limit traditional centers of tribal 
authority encouraged the growth and proliferation of informal associational links locally. 
This process conforms to Morton Fried’s observation that modern tribes are the result of 
state-building,112 as a brief survey of state and party consolidation demonstrates. 
The origin of the Iraqi Ba’th itself reveals a similar dynamic of locally-based 
communal allegiance. From the outset, personal connections and common sectarian or 
geographic origins were critical factors in party affiliation. Rooted in semi-tribal villages, 
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the conspirators of 1968 exploited locally-generated personal and kinship ties in 
engineering the July coup, managing the internecine party maneuvering that followed,113 
extending eventual control over the state and society. Hussein strategically and liberally 
used kinship and tribal affiliation since he became influential in 1966 to expand party 
membership. This provided a firm network of clan and extended family support that 
guaranteed a smooth transition from the initial military phase of the planned-coup into 
government.114 Hussein employed the same means to mobilize the party apparatus once 
in power, expanding membership from a few hundred at the time of the coup to nearly 
two million in less than eight years.115 Jabar identifies this process as “etatist” or state-
centered tribalism, whereby a vulnerable or narrow state elite attempts to deconstruct 
cultural tribal space, and integrate real and fictive tribal lineage and culture into the state 
in order to solidify the fragile dominance of the elite.116 Despite having denounced 
tribalism as antithetical to Ba’th ideology upon seizing power, Hussein sought to solidify 
his position within the party and in turn consolidate the party within the state by targeting 
specific Arab and Sunni groups located predominantly in the Sunni triangle, areas west 
and northwest of the capitol along the Euphrates, for integration into the state 
apparatus.117  As such, the bulk of elite military and security services personnel were 
recruited from Sunni Arab tribal groups such as the Dulaim, Jubbur, and ‘Ubayd, and 
were commanded by members of Hussein’s immediate or extended family, such that by 
the mid 1980s, the party and state were consolidated around Hussein, his extended 
family, the Tikriti establishment that pre-dated Hussein, and tribal groupings based in the 
Sunni triangle.118 These structures contributed to the expansion of the single-party 
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patrimonial state that dominated or destroyed exogenous civil institutions, and 
encouraged further reliance on the local-level networks described above in terms of 
resources, support, and refuge from the arbitrary power of the Hussein regime.119  
Local-level kinship affiliation was increasingly activated as the effects of war and 
sanctions on the capacity of the state became apparent. Particularly after the 1991 Gulf 
War, the state was largely impotent in terms of military, economic, and security 
functions. The process of tribal deconstruction and absorption into the disintegrating 
party and state was altered such that local-level kinship affiliation was officially revived 
or reconstructed as an extension of the state itself.120 The Hussein regime sought to 
revive the symbols and patterns of authority inherited from cultural tribalism, wherein the 
party would serve as the broad tribal unit, with authentic or fictive local associations 
retribalized in supporting roles.121 At the local level however, the urban-based kinship 
associations no longer resembled much of the traditional tribal image or patterns of 
authority. By 1996, officially sanctioned “tribes” were responsible not only for the 
maintenance of law and order locally, but also collected taxes on behalf of the 
government, were appointed judicial powers and extended tribal customary law to the 
extent of their territorial reach. They received arms and ammunition, vehicles, and 
logistical support as payment for services rendered to the party.122 Accordingly, long 
since detribalized segments of the population established new associations in response to 
the emergent local hegemony of reconstituted tribal elements. In cases where common 
lineage was no longer discernable, individuals sought affiliation with existing groups or 
formed new local associations whose tribal leadership was appointed by Baghdad.123  
Local dominance of revived tribal networks was evident by the 1998 crisis 
involving the United States, when heavily armed and equipped Sunni tribal units were 
positioned in and around Baghdad to control the restive urban population, a role formerly 
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belonging to the Ba’th party militia.124 Elsewhere, however, the interests of the Hussein 
regime and local-level actors began to diverge. Clan-based groups controlled the 
highways around Baghdad, engaging in looting, smuggling, and hijacking throughout 
most of al Anbar province in western Iraq on the Syrian border.125 From Baghdad to 
Amman, the Dulaim and Jubbur created conditions such that convoys were necessary 
even for basic travel in daylight to avoid raids by tribal guerillas.126 Notably, the Jubbur 
also furnished most of the recruits for Hussein’s elite Republican Guard.127 By 2000, 
policemen, judges, and party officials were subject to violent tribal recriminations with 
impunity, and encounters between Iraqi soldiers and tribal irregulars, especially those 
based in al Anbar province, escalated in terms of frequency and scale.128   
2. Resource Distribution and Scarcity 
Such conflict marked the emergence of local tribal elements into street-level 
entrepreneurial markets. These markets comprised a sub-stratum of the informal Iraqi 
economy that blossomed since the early 1980s due to the chronic resource scarcity 
accompanying war and unrest, a decade of sanctions, and Hussein’s selective distribution 
of what resources remained available. By directing funds, rations, government positions, 
electricity, clean water, fuel, and industrial investment toward specific villages in the 
western Sunni regions in exchange for service to the regime, and withholding resources 
to other villages as a punitive mechanism, a local-level competitive calculus developed 
that was perpetuated by Hussein as an instrument of rule.129 Because the state-level 
formal economy was dramatically curtailed by sanctions, this competition for resources 
was pushed to the sub-state informal level, consisting of local and regional economies 
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based on the legal and semi-legal enterprises of the informal sector.130 Conservative 
estimates suggest that nearly sixty-eight percent of Iraq’s national labor force was active 
in the informal economy in the latter period of Hussein’s rule, accounting for nearly one-
third of the total gross domestic product at that time.131 The tendency of party and state 
institutions to favor key supporters and engage in fraud and corruption in the distribution 
of goods and services encouraged informal (and formal) economic actors to rely on local-
level mediation by tribal groups.132 In addition, because informal activity is based in 
large part on trusted familial and kinship ties, the position of local tribal groups within the 
informal sector had become increasingly entrenched. By assessing fees for the settlement 
of disputes and collecting taxes on local production, local tribal groups also began to 
establish networks of financial support relatively free of state control.133  
These attempts to legally increase economic mobility were complimented by 
rising tribal involvement in underground criminal entrepreneurial economies which were 
especially prominent in the western border regions. Illicit economies were initially based 
on the cross-border smuggling of animals, tea, alcohol, electronics, and in later stages, 
humans and narcotics.134 This later period was marked by more extensive 
interpenetration of party and state functionaries within tribe-based organized crime, a 
result both of endemic official corruption and limited legitimate opportunities to acquire 
official resources. As such, by the end of Hussein’s tenure, the entire route along the 
Euphrates River in Al Anbar from Hit and Haditha to Ubaydi, Al Qaim, and Qusaybah 
had essentially developed into a sanctuary for illicit traffickers and criminal 
entrepreneurs.135 At the same time, massive nation-wide unemployment and a 
subsistence level below international standards of poverty for almost five million Iraqis 
(about eighteen percent of the population, up from 143,000, or about .8 percent at the 
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beginning of sanctions) indicates the magnitude of structural decay within society at 
large.136 
3. After the U.S. Invasion: Informal Networks and Resource Scarcity 
At the local level, both resource scarcity and the stature of sub-tribal groups were 
greatly enhanced following the removal of Hussein. The Coalition Provisional 
Authority’s (CPA) early adoption of a neo-liberal economic posture137 impeded the 
growth of regulatory and legal institutions, impelling businesses and those entering the 
labor market to rely on the trusted kinship or extended family networks of the informal 
economy. Shortages of critical inputs such as electricity and fuel, and the dangers of 
transportation have further encouraged informal entrepreneurs to rely on tribal and 
extended family associations for protection and support.138 Additionally, endemic 
corruption and uncertainty have contributed to a dramatic increase in the informal sector 
following the 2003 invasion, such that approximately eighty percent of the labor force is 
now engaged informally, accounting for nearly two-thirds of Iraq’s gross national 
product.139 This shift is especially clear in certain areas west of the capitol, where the 
destruction of the Sunni-oriented military establishment and related industries has 
contributed to a substantial expansion of the informal sector.140 A principal driver of this 
growth has been a dramatic rise in criminal activity related to the shadow economy and 
dominated by local-level tribal elements, including the emerging economies based on the 
distribution of scarce resources, kidnapping, trafficking in petrol, narcotics, looted 
weaponry, and the targeting of coalition forces.141 In areas beyond the control of the 
transitional Iraqi government and lacking a substantial coalition presence, evidence 
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suggests that the shadow economy is rapidly displacing any legal or semi-legal structures 
that may have survived until the present.142 
In sum, structural conditions within Iraqi society are impacting the emerging 
threat environment. The most prominent of these conditions are the state-level social and 
economic arrangements inherited from the period of Ba’th rule. The major effects of 
these structures on the origins and orientation of insurgent groups have been identified 
here. First, the decades-long process of development and consolidation under Saddam 
Hussein ultimately favored the institutional devolution of state authority to local-level 
groups that are comprised of genuine or artificially reconstructed tribal associations. 
Second, in an effort to preserve central authority, the Hussein regime initiated a 
competitive calculus between and among local-level groups based on the distribution of 
scarce resources that is discernable in the present context. Third, the emergence of local-
level groups as the cultural repository of solidarity and mobility within a competitive, 
informal economic space has facilitated the expansion of a vibrant shadow economy. 
C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
Iraqi society reflected a complex interaction of forces culminating most 
powerfully at the local-level by the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003. How have the 
invasion itself and the subsequent periods of occupation and transitional rule affected 
relationships at this level? The removal of the Hussein regime and the actions of the CPA 
presented a range of opportunities and constraints that have in part determined the 
manner in which street-level groups mobilized and generated new opportunities and 
constraints for both the original actors and follow-on groups over time. The utility of 
considering these factors is greater than a mere understanding of the effects of past 
actions as they manifest currently, but is also necessary to conceptualize what political 
opportunities are developing now, and what likely changes in insurgent dynamics will 
occur in the future. Because political opportunities relate differently to different actors, I 
begin by establishing the parameters of the street-level environment in Sunni-dominated 
areas. For this, a phased chronology in three parts is used that identifies groups of actors 
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according to their relative prominence and examines the type and timing of opportunities 
that have facilitated the expansion of insurgent groups during each period. 
1. Phase One: March 2003-December 2003 
Phase one of this model encompasses the time period from the fall of the Ba’th 
regime to the winter of 2003, when the Pentagon officially recognized that anti-coalition 
violence had become a sustained threat. During this phase, the persistent lack of security 
and the policy directives issued by the CPA accounted for the greatest opportunities for 
armed groups to expand their positions locally. Within this period, the most prominent 
actors at the street-level in terms of mobilization potential, organization, and stature 
within the surrounding community were those legacy groups of local/kinship based 
“tribal” associations reminiscent of the period under sanctions. As some members of 
these groups also comprised the personnel infrastructure of the Ba’th security 
establishment in terms of the intelligence services, fedayeen143 irregulars, and entire army 
units, coalition officials were at lest partially correct when applying the term “former-
regime elements” to those groups thought most responsible for the unexpectedly high 
levels of violence and chaos in the aftermath of the invasion. Such a description 
implicitly suggests that these groups were also supporters of the Hussein regime, yet the 
reverse might also have been true. Overt coup and assassination attempts by disaffected 
Juburri and Dulaimi elements from within the security services complemented the 
prevailing tribal unrest of the mid-late 1990s, suggesting that many Sunni tribal groups 
had been clandestinely organizing and arming for insurrection from at least 1995.144 Such 
behavior is consistent with patterns of Iraqi resistance, evidenced by the Ba’th coups of 
1963 and 1968 that were the culmination of years of clandestine maneuvering according 
to lineage and local affiliation. These groups are referred to as ‘tribal groups,” and 
function according to Khoury’s model of tribal militia: they are composed of pre-existing 
social groups within the tribe that come armed and equipped, and they are activated by 
conflict, inspired leadership, and the prospect of loot.145 A second tier of street-level 
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protagonists was comprised of those groups engaged in entrepreneurial and organized 
criminal activities, also a legacy of the sanctions period in large measure and based 
predominantly on local-level associations.146 While there are indications of at least some 
degree of overlap between the two tiers, it is worth noting that many tribal groups 
maintained militias precisely to protect entrepreneurial markets from Ba’th 
encroachment, militating against a broad alignment of street-level interests between these 
groups, at least in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.  
The chaotic lawlessness of this period represents the earliest and most substantial 
opportunity that allowed groups in both tiers to solidify and extend their presence locally. 
Hesitation on the part of coalition forces to manage the deteriorating security situation in 
most urban centers and Baghdad in particular acted as a catalyst in the very process of 
institutional devolution that had been occurring under the Hussein regime. The vacuum 
that developed in the weeks following the invasion increased the scale and intensity of 
this process as the role of self-protecting mutual assurance groups matched the 
precipitous decline of law and order.147 Armed groups proliferated at the street level 
corresponding to the territorial boundaries of specific neighborhoods or by kinship 
affiliation. In such cases, protection of the group and its membership in the uncertain 
social environment characterized by looting and violence determined the degree and form 
of collective mobilization. Easy access to munitions through stolen-weapons bazaars 
facilitated the entry of newly-formed groups onto the street level, sometimes in response 
to outbreaks of intra-tribal fighting, particularly among the Sunni.148 This trend 
highlights the initial position of criminal entrepreneurs and traditional clan-based 
organized crime, whose stature at the street-level also increased in proportion to the 
absence of law and order. While occupying the same street-level political space, the 
interests of these groups were defined largely in terms of greater individual and collective 
economic mobility.  
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The CPA policies of “de-bathification,” disbanding of the Iraqi national army, and 
the ambivalence toward the role of militias represent a second political opportunity 
dramatically augmenting the stature of street-level groups in terms of security and access 
to resources. This expanded role was consistent with effects of pushing millions of 
newly-unemployed Iraqis into a system dominated by locally-oriented informal networks, 
such that the “skills” and associations of the new entrants undoubtedly affected dynamics 
at the street-level. For instance, the demobilization of entire Republican Guard units that 
returned to their local settings weapons-in-hand149 increased the potency of street-level 
protagonists across the Sunni spectrum. By the closing months of 2003 when coalition 
officials recognized the potential of a limited insurgency, the role of street-level groups in 
terms of providing law and order, protection, and access to resources had increased 
significantly. This trend is due to the confusion and disorder inherent in regime collapse, 
in addition to the inability of the coalition to reassert order or basic services for months, 
providing ample and fertile conditions for the emergence of resistance elements.150   
2. Phase Two: December 2003-January 2005 
The second phase spans the end of 2003 until the elections in January 2005. 
Sustained hostile interaction between coalition troops and local populations, the inability 
of coalition forces to adequately repress insurgent violence, and the return of sovereignty 
to the Iraqi government provided the most significant opportunities for insurgent-group 
expansion during this period. Broadly speaking, the dominant groups at this stage 
reflected a three-tiered structure. The networks corresponding to the two most prominent 
types of actors from phase one exhibited a higher degree of overlap in the second phase. 
This combination of tribally-based former security personnel and criminal groups 
comprised the first tier. The second and third tiers were occupied by indigenous actors 
motivated by vendetta, and extremist Islamic ideologies, respectively. During this phase, 
personal security remained the primary concern of Iraqis in general, although the 
meaning of security in Sunni-dominated areas had expanded to include security from 
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local armed groups in addition to protection from coalition forces.151 This shift is due in 
part to increased interactions between coalition forces and the Sunni population as a 
result of expanded efforts to establish law and order and manage increasingly effective 
anti-coalition violence. As such, the negative effects of more vigorous coalition 
encroachment, most evident in the collateral costs of the Fallujah operations and the 
abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib, represented a substantial political opportunity by 
further legitimizing the existence of armed street-level groups. The effects of Abu Ghraib 
are significant, since ninety-five percent of all detainees during this period were Sunni 
Arab.152 This helped to solidify a perception that the coalition targeted the Sunni 
community exclusively and indiscriminately. The territorial gains made by encroaching 
coalition forces in Falluja and similar advances in Samarra, Ramadi, Mosul and Tikrit 
magnified and in some cases validated much of this perception through near-continuous 
hostile interaction with local populations. This process facilitated the emergence of the 
second and third tier of violent street-level actors.153  These actors, predominantly 
foreign in the latter case, were easily absorbed by the expanding networks of the most 
prominent street-level groups that provided both the means and an added incentive to 
engage in anti-coalition targeting by offering substantial monetary rewards.  
These relationships highlight a second political opportunity in the continued 
difficulty of coalition forces to counter the expansion of local groups, most notably in the 
vast Sunni stronghold of al Anbar province. Despite the increase in resources devoted to 
Falluja and Ramadi, the street-level presence of coalition forces had actually diminished 
in western al Anbar by the end of this phase, retaining a minimal presence at al Qaim and 
Qusayba.154 Notably, the local-level presence of Iraqi police and national guards 
remained at constant levels of virtual or actual nonexistence throughout the province 
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during this period.155 These factors contributed to the continued expansion of local tribal-
criminal networks, such that most of the available political space at this level had been 
effectively captured by the elections in 2005.156  
This process was stimulated in part by the resumption of Iraqi control over 
government portfolios and the national budget after June 2004. This shift in 
accountability represented a political opportunity at the street-level in two ways. First, 
with budgetary authority no longer at the discretion of coalition officials, flexibility at the 
local-level in terms of resource distribution was dramatically curtailed. The allocation of 
state assets reflected a new calculus that tended to favor those interests centered in 
Baghdad over the remote provincial areas. As such, functions ranging from the payment 
of newly trained security services personnel to the allocation of contracts for 
infrastructure development were slowed or diverted, diminishing the capacity of the 
coalition to respond to conflict conditions and impeding the overall reconstruction 
effort.157 Second, newly appointed ministers fostered a climate of parochialism by 
attempting to establish an independent, self-supporting infrastructure within the new 
institutions under their control. The relationship between the Ministries of Interior and 
Defense is instructive, as both offices assumed control of an array of smaller “special” 
units comprised of thousands of supporters and local affiliates, sustained by diverted 
funds intended for aid and reconstruction.158 This process is not unique to either ministry, 
as the institutional reliance on local clientele networks under the CPA and within the 
interim government was widespread. 
The national elections marking the end of this phase represented an indirect 
constraint on the expansion of street-level groups within Sunni areas, since it indicated 
that reconstruction and government-building would proceed despite significant Sunni 
protest and a high degree of violence. The willingness of the remaining sections of the 
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population to participate clearly demonstrated the political limitations of the most 
powerful armed Sunni groups, although the net effect over the entire period demonstrates 
a relative increase in the stature of Sunni groups locally. While some resistance groups 
were pushed below the street level in places like Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, and 
Samarra, coalition and Iraqi government forces were slow to reestablish sustained 
presence in these areas and thus unable to recapture this space. 
3. Phase Three: January 2005-Summer 2005 
The period from the January elections until the projected unveiling of the new 
Iraqi constitution comprises the third phase. This period has been marked by the 
continuing effects of earlier stages, in addition to a new set of opportunities defined by 
elite cleavages within the Iraqi National Assembly, the increased politicization of 
communal militias, and the uninterrupted expansion of the shadow economy. Changes in 
the street-level dynamic have so far been consistent with these opportunities for 
expansion, indicating a first-tier of actors that exhibit a high degree of overlap between 
entrepreneurial and organized criminal networks, Iraqis harboring some form of vendetta 
or personal grievance against the coalition, and elements of the former security 
establishment. A second tier of actors is comprised of foreign and domestic Islamic 
extremists. Both groups intensified activities in the aftermath of the elections, 
contributing to the split in elite consensus regarding the relative influence of Sunni 
representation at the state-level.159 In this sense, the power-sharing arrangements in the 
Iraqi National Assembly have encouraged polarization and elite cleavages, so far 
deflating hopes for the speedy integration of the Sunni minority into the political process. 
Reports of communally-based militias gaining prominence throughout these proceedings 
are consistent with the dynamics of street-level expansion described in earlier stages, and 
will undoubtedly contribute to further local polarization.160 As such, the prospects of 
additional Sunni alienation from a political process increasingly dominated at the street-
level by the use of armed groups, suggest that a decline in the role of such Sunni groups 
is unlikely. Notably, reports in early June indicated that the Islamic Army of Iraq and the 
                                                 
159 Deborah Amos, “Some Iraqi Insurgents May Be Ready to Negotiate,” NPR’s All Things 
Considered, 8 June 2005. < http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4694994 >(7/20/2005). 
160 Edward Wong, “Leaders of Iraq Support Militias and Widen Rift,” New York Times, June 9, 2005 
< http://www.nytimes.com/> (7/20/2005).     
48
Army of Mujahideen, violent indigenous Islamic extremist groups with substantial local 
support, have sought entrance into the political process following a move to expand 
Sunni representation on the constitutional committee.161 The lukewarm reaction of the 
Shiite majority to this potential political opening will establish a precedent with profound 
implications on the likelihood for other Sunni groups to pursue a similar course.    
One factor tending to decrease the likelihood that Sunni groups will capitalize on 
a relative opening of state-level political space in the near term is the draw of economic 
mobility via the shadow economy. Underground criminal economies represent a political 
opportunity in and of themselves in this phase of conflict because economic imperatives 
are playing a larger part in structuring the street-level dynamic. As in earlier stages, 
demand for weapons, stolen goods, and hostages determine the roles and relationships 
between street-level actors more so than ideological or political convictions. Yet in this 
phase, engagement in the black market has not merely enabled sustained street-level 
activity, but has in many cases become the activity itself, dominating collective resources 
and driving group expansion in terms of capabilities and reach.162 This shift is evident in 
certain portions of al Anbar province, where despite the frequency of anti-coalition 
targeting, criminal endeavors are now thought to account for the bulk of street-level 
activity.163 
During each phase of this conflict, the position of locally-oriented armed groups 
has been solidified and expanded consistent with the type and timing of the political 
opportunities available. The most significant of these opportunities have been identified 
as the slow recognition of security conditions that facilitated the establishment of armed 
groups and the pervasive negligence on the part of the occupational authorities in the first 
phase. However, the U.S. role in shaping insurgent behavior at that stage should not be 
overstated. To suggest that U.S. miscalculations after the invasion “created” the 
insurgency overestimates the U.S. position, and risks an over-assessment of U.S. 
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capabilities to directly constrain and limit insurgent actors. Rather, the U.S. role in the 
first phase might be viewed as that of a catalyst, facilitating and amplifying processes that 
relate more strongly to the structural conditions resulting from the constraints of the 
sanctions regime. The assessment of opportunities in the second and third phases 
indicates an appreciable shift in the street-level dynamic in terms of the relative 
prominence of certain actors. This transition has favored the position of indigenous actors 
radicalized through interaction with the coalition, with a high degree of overlap between 
all groups and the shadow economy in the current phase. State-level political openings 
may lure some elements of resistance into the political process, but in the present phase, 
the draw of the shadow economy may be sufficiently strong to keep groups engaged in 
street-level violence. 
D. MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES 
When political opportunities arise, the means and extent to which insurgent 
groups benefit from them varies. Most street-level groups are not well-positioned to 
pursue every opening for expansion. The distinctive feature of groups that can effectively 
capitalize on these opportunities is a capacity for sustained mobilization, which itself is 
contingent upon the establishment of effective mobilization structures as described in 
Chapter I. This section examines how insurgent groups are mobilizing and sustaining 
operations, and focuses on the role of organizational form and the effects of connectivity 
to the broader environment. The first segment considers the organizational form of the 
four predominant group-types (not including coalition forces) active in the Sunni 
insurgency: local tribal groups, traditional criminal organizations (TCOs), indigenous 
Islamic extremist groups, and violent transnational enterprises (VTEs). While all have 
adopted some type of networked organization, the specific properties of each 
organizational form vary and should be considered separately. The latter half of this 
section examines the importance of external connectivity within the broader mobilization 
structure, identifying the nature of interactions between insurgents and local populations, 
state institutions, and other armed groups. 
1. Organizational Form 
The predominant organizational forms adopted by insurgent groups exhibit 
variations of a flat, interconnected, loosely-structured cellular design. With the exception 
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of VTEs, group structures are based predominantly on locally-oriented associations, 
either through kinship or communal solidarity. The most effective unit of organization 
locally is the sub-clan or extended family (hamoula) network.164 According to Khoury, 
this unit represented a loose form of social organization and reproduction that during the 
post-colonial period regulated the distribution of scarce resources.165 In the contemporary 
context, these resources are generally linked to markets rather than oriented specifically 
toward territory, as had been the case traditionally.166  Hamoula are lineage based, and 
united by Khaldoun’s principal of ‘asabiya, or tribal solidarity. Where hamoula 
networks, both genuine and fictive, are no longer discernable, local groups are associated 
by common residence and intermarriage.167 These networks of extended family, 
communal, and geographic affiliation provide the foundation for many of the units 
operating at the street level,168 whether politically-oriented insurgent groups, organized 
criminal elements, or any of the combinations on the vast continuum of groups 
comprising “the” Sunni insurgency. In this sense, it is difficult to describe an 
organizational model of “the” insurgent group, although indigenous Sunni tribal groups 
responsible for most of the coalition casualties in western Baghdad and al Anbar province 
exhibit some common characteristics. First, hamoula and local associations relate the 
operational membership in a loosely structured network of cells linked vertically.169 Cell-
size varies greatly, ranging from two to fifty members, and each cell is thought to retain a 
high degree of autonomy and functional independence.170 Second, evidence such as the 
discovery of hundreds of pre-made IED’s in the special operations directorate of the Iraqi 
intelligence service171 compound during the U.S.-led invasion indicates that 
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mukhabarat172 and Ba’th regime functionaries influenced the initial organization and 
direction of tribal groups. It is likely that some of these personalities remain influential 
below the street-level, but reports suggest that tribal and kinship networks have absorbed 
newly-radicalized Sunnis in increasing numbers.173  
Similarly, TCOs are one prominent segment of the street-level ecology known 
with few exceptions to organize according to kinship and family associations. Iraqi TCOs 
are dominated by a handful of clans and extended families with some cross-border 
connections, mainly through Syria and Turkey. It is thought that high-level former regime 
functionaries who were interconnected with these groups during the 1990s now influence 
or control much of their activity.174 This will likely contribute to a process of structural 
change that has been ongoing since the early 1990s, when organized criminal groups 
throughout the region began to adopt horizontal cell-based compositions.175 In general 
terms, TCOs are dominated by a central core consisting of a family head and his 
immediate allies and kin. This element is distanced from street-level operations by a 
compartmentalized hub-type network, and the organizations themselves are more 
oriented toward large-scale operations and wholesaling in regional economies than in the 
past.176 TCOs typically subcontract out lucrative street-level distribution operations to 
local groups that need not be affiliated by lineage, although minor sub-clans tend to 
dominate these networks.177  
Incessant fighting between minor groups and sub-clans over distribution rights 
contributes to the high levels of criminal violence in Iraq presently, although locally-
affiliated “crews”178 of criminal entrepreneurs are likely responsible for a substantial 
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portion, if not the majority of all violent incidents.179 It is likely that crews are bound by 
some degree of extended kinship, as seems to be the case in Iraq generally, although the 
crew itself is purely a means of entrepreneurial access. In this role, the crew functions as 
the “for-hire” criminal element of insurgent activities, thought to account for most of the 
infrastructure damage plaguing the reconstruction effort, as well as the mercenary 
kidnapping, hijackings, assassinations and other functions of the shadow economy.180 
Crews are also affiliated with TCOs on an ad-hoc, per job basis, performing similar 
functions. As such, the part-time entrepreneurial engagement of these groups represents a 
force multiplier for the more politically-oriented resistance elements, contributing to the 
absence of law and order that legitimizes their existence locally at the expense of the new 
government.  In some cases, the membership of a crew will overlap in whole or in part 
with resistance elements,181 a trend that increases in proportion to the expansion of the 
shadow economy. 
Violent Islamic extremist groups, both indigenous and foreign, are less directly 
involved in the criminal contribution to insurgent aggression than the hamoula/locally 
based groups noted above. Some domestic Islamist groups have maintained a presence 
within Iraq that predates the U.S. invasion by several years. For instance, Ansar al Islam 
is the latest manifestation of an overlapping network of extremist groups that has been 
active in Iraq since at least 2001.182 These groups are politically motivated, and strike un-
Islamic targets in accordance with a radical interpretation of Islam that promotes violent 
religious struggle. Domestic groups such as Ansar al Islam and the newly formed Army 
of the Mujahadeen are considered street-level actors in the second and third phase of 
conflict due to evolving trends in targeting relative to the first phase. In place of striking 
international-level targets (the UN and Red Crescent bombings) and national-level targets 
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(Kurdish political party headquarters), indigenous Islamic extremist groups are at present 
oriented locally, targeting police stations, cafes, and local officials with greater 
frequency. These groups are also thought to recruit and organize according to extended 
kinship relationships. Notably, Ansar al-Islam numbers approximately one-hundred core 
members all thought to originate from the same clan in the Kurdish north.183 Ansar, and 
other indigenous groups based in al Anbar province are known to have undergone a 
similar degree of interpenetration with elements of the regime security services 
infrastructure, at least initially. One possible indication is the discovery of caches of 
suicide vests and belts produced by the explosives section of the M-14 branch of Iraqi 
intelligence,184 a favored tactic of indigenous extremist groups before the recent 
proliferation of vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED), or car bomb use 
across the spectrum of actors.  
VTEs such as the organization headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Jama'at al-
Tawhid wal Jihad, have a more complex and sophisticated profile than other operational 
groups, due to the range and fluidity of environments and actors that comprise these 
networks.  At the local level, VTEs are smaller in terms of size and self-contained 
capabilities relative to indigenous groups. However, the effect of VTEs locally is more 
appropriately measured in terms of mobilization potential versus actual mobilization 
capacity. Zarqawi’s significance and reach are in this sense predominantly a function of 
local affiliates. For instance, it is known that growing numbers of Zarqawi supporters and 
volunteers filtered across borders with Jordan and Syria into the mid-Euphrates region 
through a series of mosques and then into Baghdad or Mosul.185 This network of 
supporters is not necessarily controlled by Zarqawi, operating instead with relative 
independence and autonomy. Zarqawi’s ability to connect and manage such a disparate 
and dispersed range of units is a unique advantage of VTE organizational form within an 
information-age context. 
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The utility of this form for street-level mobilization is partially apparent in 
Zarqawi’s ability to briefly assemble small, local units for larger operations, such as the 
spring raid on Abu Ghraib prison that employed approximately one hundred Iraqi and 
foreign irregulars.186 A more significant component of the VTE network at this level 
relates to the use of communications and information technologies. Operational units 
within the Zarqawi network are known to maintain constant communication with units in 
Syria, the Gulf states, and Afghanistan, relaying updated information on coalition forces 
and successful tactics.187 Locally, individuals employ text messaging and multiple cell 
phones to evade signals interception, and closely monitor satellite media and internet 
traffic for nearly real time reporting on damage assessment and local feedback in the 
aftermath of attacks. VTEs and affiliated groups are also particularly adept at 
manipulating these same tools as a component of their political campaign, such as 
Zarqawi’s tendency to execute hostages in ways that ensure broad media coverage and 
enhance the political impact of the event.188 
2. External Connectivity 
Organizational attributes are one important determinant of operational 
sustainability, complimented by the second pillar of street-level mobilization: effective 
connectivity with the broader environment. The crucial linkages that armed groups must 
establish and maintain are with the local community, sate institutions, and other armed 
groups. At the community level, connectivity is comprised of a functional association 
based on a number of “exchange relationships”189 in which the group and the community 
provide reciprocal services according to the model described in Chapter I. Insurgent 
groups operating locally are dependent on the community to provide the requisite 
political space for development and expansion. In the current phase of conflict, the local 
community is the primary source of recruitment for indigenous groups, and also 
represents the communications, surveillance, and information infrastructure necessary for 
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operations against competing groups.190 At this level, strong community affiliation 
remains a critical component of the group’s defensive capabilities, providing the 
necessary haven from persistent COIN pressure and legitimizing the group’s position.191 
In order to sustain this position, a locally-based insurgent group must adopt a reactive 
role consistent with popular perceptions of community interests. As such, these groups 
are unable to pursue long-term political agendas independent of community support,192 
indicating that locally-based groups harbor far less radical ambitions concerning the 
distribution of power and authority relative to their base of support than is commonly 
thought. On the other side of this exchange, local groups must satisfy community 
obligations in order to guarantee support. Broadly speaking, these groups are expected to 
serve as forums for conflict mediation, establish law and order in the areas within their 
reach, and provide access to resources.193  
In the environment of scarcity that characterizes the most active Sunni areas, the 
availability of resources is partially a function of the level of interpenetration between 
insurgent groups and the institutions of the state. Reporting indicates that many of the 
new Iraqi ministries and administrative offices are thoroughly penetrated by those 
directly or indirectly in support of resistance elements.194  Because many of these 
positions are staffed according to extended family networks, almost all levels of 
administration are accessible to these groups, either through intimidation and coercion or 
complicity and corruption.195 This process of intimidation and infiltration is largely 
responsible for the ineffectiveness of the indigenous law-enforcement and security 
establishment. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that a substantial portion of the 
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hastily recruited police force is active in insurgent violence. Despite this recognition, 
wages, equipment, and funding intended for infrastructure continues to flow to resistance 
forces through official channels, and a replicated throughout the administrative structure 
of the new Iraqi state. Thus, coalition forces and the Iraqi government are essentially 
subsidizing many aspects of insurgent activity that they seek to control, consistent with 
the precedent established by the Hussein regime in the latter period of decline.  
Interactions between insurgent groups account for the third type of connectivity 
that determines the effectiveness and extent of group mobilization. These interactions 
maximize the unique advantages of networked organizational form that have been 
described in previous sections. The relationships between VTEs, local groups, and TCOs 
demonstrate this utility. Both VTE’s and locally-based groups maintain instrumental 
relationships with TCOs. VTEs are often in need of laundering large sums of money 
generated through their own financial support networks, in addition to acquiring 
munitions and supporting equipment, both areas in which TCOs specialize.196 VTEs and 
local groups also rely on TCOs for access to resource and distribution networks in both 
the legitimate and shadow economies. At present, TCO dominance of the Euphrates 
routes into Syria are the critical lifeline supplying extremist recruits, logistics, and havens 
for local groups fighting in al Anbar.197 In addition, the underground weapons economy 
ensures that there will be no shortage of armaments in the near term, and highly-
advanced weaponry is appearing in greater quantities from abroad.198 TCOs also 
dominate the distribution of heavy weapons and artillery looted in the aftermath of the 
invasion, such as the four-hundred tons of plastic explosives stolen from the al Qaqaa 
weapons site.199 The relationships between indigenous armed groups, religiously 
motivated and otherwise, and VTEs is one element of the Iraq case suggesting a shift at 
the street-level toward an information-age model of conflict. Links between VTEs and 
locally-oriented groups follow a similar pattern of expediency and resources exchange 
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analogous to the relationships formed between both groups and TCOs. This tendency has 
been demonstrated by the discussion of VTE organizational form in the previous section. 
The essential difference in the case of VTE-local group interaction is that the VTE 
requires a robust connection to local groups for operational support, while local groups 
are capable of sustaining operational levels through intermittent or limited exchange with 
VTEs. 
In summary, insurgent groups are unequally suited to capitalize on developing 
opportunities for expansion. This disparity is primarily a function of group capabilities to 
mobilize and maintain effective mobilization structures. For groups active at the street-
level, the two essential components of mobilization structures relate to the properties of 
organization form, and levels of connectivity with the broader environment. In terms of 
organizational form, the four types of groups that are responsible for the preponderance 
of insurgent activity, local tribal groups, traditional criminal organizations, indigenous 
Islamic extremist groups, and transnational criminal enterprises each exhibit similar 
tendencies to employ horizontal cell-based networked structures. With the exception of 
the core leadership of VTEs, each of these groups are organized and recruited according 
to locally-oriented associations, either through extended family or communal links.  
The most significant aspects of how groups establish effective connectivity to the 
broader environment were also identified. Each group active at the street-level must 
balance the crucial linkages with the local population, state institutions, and other armed 
groups. Interactions at the community level are governed by a set of instrumental 
exchange relationships that fosters a reactive profile among locally-oriented groups. This 
in part drives insurgent groups to seek greater interpenetration with resource-rich state 
institutions. Interactions with other armed groups, particularly those that span from the 
street to the transnational levels, are one important indicator that a shift from industrial to 
information-age conflict is underway. These interactions are characterized by a similar 
set of instrumental exchanges that have in part determined the effectiveness and extent of 
insurgent group mobilization. 
E. THE DYNAMICS OF COMPETITON 
Preceding sections have investigated the origins of insurgent groups, the 
opportunities that led to their prominence, and the manner of mobilization. This section 
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considers the logic of competition that drives each of these processes and how it is 
affecting the developing threat environment in the current phase of conflict. The first 
segment considers the parameters of the competitive dynamic and the role of U.S.-led 
forces. The second segment examines the effects of competition on the interactions 
between Sunni insurgent groups and overall levels of insurgent violence. In some ways, 
the competitive dynamic has subsumed the effects of anti-coalition violence on the 
process of reconstruction and development, what in official terms constitutes “the 
insurgency.”200 As of June 2005, the Baghdad morgue estimated that at least sixty 
percent of all fatalities resulted from gunshot wounds that were unrelated to the 
insurgency, due instead to a combination of tribal vendetta, vengeance killing, 
kidnapping attempts201 and other related activities.202 Elements of this dynamic are 
legacies of the Hussein regime’s attempts to maintain a local-level balance between 
Sunni tribal groups as described in previous sections. Extreme levels of violence 
associated with this process were not uncommon. One tribal land dispute beginning in the 
mid 1990s near Kut escalated into a medium-intensity guerilla war, including the use of 
heavy artillery between several tribes resulting in nearly 300 fatalities and leaving more 
than 400 wounded.203 In addition to incessant conflict between and among local tribal 
groups, there are significant and recent precedents for the incitement of violence by tribal 
and clan leaderships against the central control of Saddam Hussein and his clientele, most 
often a function of tribal vendetta. Notable examples include uprisings among the Jubur 
within the officer corps, resulting in the bombardment of the presidential palace, and a 
general uprising by the Dulaim in Ramadi in the mid 1990s.204 By that time, regional 
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alignments of tribal groups had become firmly entrenched in certain cities,205 generating 
institutionalized urban rivalries in Fallujah, Ramadi, Qusaybah, and western Baghdad. 
1. Parameters of Competition and the Role of Coalition Forces in Phase 
Three 
Similar forces of competition are pervasive in the present context. Each group 
active at the street-level, including coalition forces, seeks the same immediate goals of 
establishing, maintaining, or enlarging their local-level presence at the expense of each 
remaining group, viewed as potential or actual competitors in terms of capturing markets, 
local support, prestige, and other resources. In many cases, this calculus has been 
reinforced by the concept of tribal vendetta. Briefly stated, the traditional model of a 
vendetta arises after an offense has been perpetrated by a member of group A against any 
member of group B, and that offense is followed by retaliation from any member of 
group B against any member of group A. This process of retribution will proceed until 
compensation and peace has been offered by all members of group A. The dividends of 
compensation are shared by all of the members of group B.206 The institution has clearly 
been modified and used in competitive processes for financial and political benefit, but 
such events remain perceived by observers as the tribal vendetta of old.  
As shown in earlier sections, the tendency of self-protecting mutual assurance 
groups to assert their presence increases in the absence of weak central authority. One 
consequence of this trend is that mechanisms for collective security and responsibility 
such as the tribal vendetta predominate.207 These mechanisms are activated to resolve the 
lack of institutional guarantees for community well-being in terms pf physical safety and 
access to resources. This process is solidly linked to the competitive dynamic, and the 
most visible manifestation of this relationship is the inter-tribal violence attributed to 
vendetta. The less discernible components of this process are the political and economic 
considerations that guide violent inter-group exchanges. The forces that initiate and 
sustain this violence are firmly rooted in the rational assessments of expected gains made 
by the contending parties. The tribal uprisings among the Jubur and Dulaim mentioned 
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above reflect this rationale. In each case, Saddam Hussein executed a prominent tribal 
figure implicated in a coup attempt in late 1990.208 The retributive violence that erupted 
between members of both tribes and Hussein’s Tikriti tribal base exhibited the expected 
pattern of large-scale tribal vendetta. The prominent role of aggrieved kinsmen in the 
escalation of this conflict obscures the distinct competitive rationale that bounded much 
of the inter-tribal violence.  
Throughout the 1980s, the growing prominence of the Jubur and Dulaim within 
the state security apparatus corresponded to an increase in political stature, challenging 
the privileged status of the Tikriti establishment. The executions of prominent figures 
from within these rising blocs were calculated to diminish their growing independence 
from Baghdad. The result was the violent continuation of the same process: the aspiring 
groups sought greater political, economic, and social benefits from the regime, and the 
established group sought to deny this encroachment for as long as possible.209 A similar 
dynamic informs tribal relationships in the present context. The outward appearance of 
impulsive, vengeful hostility stems from rivalry based on unequal distribution of 
resources and influence. In this sense, to observe that a violent dispute is “tribal” 
recognizes only that a corporate interest of some kind is at stake. The designation by 
itself does not automatically indicate the likely causes or methods to diminish levels of 
violence. The inherent risk in categorizing street-level violence as a function of tribal 
vendetta is that crucial linkages to the competitive dynamic are obscured. A more 
accurate representation is that the mechanism of tribal vendetta frames the competitive 
rationale based on political and economic imperatives.          
This dynamic is especially visible within the newly recruited Iraqi security forces. 
In one telling incident, locally recruited and trained Iraqi police were issued ammunition 
marked in blue ink as an accountability measure. A nearby unit of the Iraqi National 
Guard, also recruited locally, was issued ammunition marked in red. After a series of 
nighttime firefights involving insurgent groups and coalition forces, it was observed that 
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the insurgents were also using ammunition marked in red and blue ink, and that for the 
most part they had been aiming at each other.210 In fact, tribal feuding accounts for a 
large portion of the violence that draws coalition forces into a particular area. This is 
especially prevalent in al Anbar province, where tribal groups are known to inform 
against rivals with the intention of precipitating a U.S. response, typically resulting in a 
raid or realignment of reconstruction assistance.211 This pattern is known to coalition 
officials based in the area, however coalition forces are ill-positioned to determine the 
relevant trends in local competition or to actively exploit tribal cleavages that may diffuse 
levels of anti-coalition violence.212  
The role of coalition forces in phase three reflects a limited understanding of the 
emerging competitive dynamic that is driving events at the street-level. To date, coalition 
forces have favored decisive and overwhelming cordon-and-search operations intended to 
clear territory and capture suspected insurgent elements.213 This emphasis reflects a 
misrepresentation of the relationship between territory, insurgent groups, local 
populations, and coalition capabilities. First, in broad terms, the violent groups that 
comprise the insurgency are effectively de-linked from a reliance on specific territories, 
and instead rely on resilient markets for resources short of physical havens. Second, 
coalition forces lack the capability to hold specific territories after they have been cleared 
of insurgents due to manpower constraints, leading insurgents to inevitably reclaim the 
streets following the departure of coalition troops. Territory in and of itself is largely 
inconsequential in this stage of conflict. Lastly, the negative effects of cordon-and-search 
tactics including indiscriminate detentions and destruction of property have guaranteed 
the essential havens for insurgent groups that coalition forces seek to deny. 214 
Conversely, decisive and discriminate operations, such a those in Hit and Qusaybah in 
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spring 2004, encourage a higher number of community defections in terms of informants 
and collaborators.215 The contemporary use of cordon-and-search tactics underscores a 
tenuous grasp of the mechanisms that coalition forces are confronting. As described in 
the previous chapter, industrial-age insurgencies have generated very specific parameters 
concerning the proper role of military force in an urban context, particularly in one of a 
liberation insurgency as is the case presently. The cordon-and-search has been a famously 
discredited tactic in such an environment since the failed British COIN efforts during the 
Palestine Mandate, and current trends indicate that the utility of this tactic has not 
increased with age. 
2. The Effects of Competition:  Intra-Insurgency Relations and Effects 
on Violence 
The spring and summer 2005 offensives in Baghdad and al Anbar province have 
demonstrated how the competitive dynamic is affecting insurgent behavior. Increasingly, 
coalition forces have entered contested regions to find “red-on-red” or inter-insurgent 
battles already underway. In some cases, insurgent groups have disengaged from attacks 
against coalition forces only to engage a separate insurgent group newly-arrived on the 
battlefield.216 In other cases, insurgent groups have staged medium-intensity battles while 
virtually disregarding the presence of coalition troops.217 Arguably, the influence and 
reach of the insurgent groups is at its highest point since March 2003, so the high levels 
of inter-group violence and factionalization visible since the elections in January 2005 
may seem incongruous. This segment considers the effects of the competitive dynamic on 
the interactions between prominent insurgent groups, and examines how this competition 
has affected the overall level of insurgent violence in the current phase. 
The marked deterioration of the relationships between VTEs and local tribal 
groups based in al Anbar province is the most visible manifestation of the effects of inter-
insurgency competition. Hostile exchanges between these groups are generally confined 
to areas where Sunni insurgent groups are already predominant and target partisans from 
either side, so the affect on the overall level of violence is minimal. Tensions began to 
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surface shortly after Zarqawi’s reappearance in al Anbar province following his 
expulsion from Mosul and northern Iraq. At present, it seems unlikely that Zarqawi will 
be able to maintain a street-level presence in al Anbar for much longer. This is due in part 
to his organization’s preference (as of spring 2005) for indiscriminant attacks targeting 
large numbers of Iraqi civilians, in addition to becoming entangled in local inter-tribal 
disputes.218 The composition of Zarqawi’s network is also unclear in terms of ethnic and 
communal affiliation. It is known that much of this network is comprised of ethnic Kurds 
and non-Iraqi nationals,219 potentially a source of friction among the indigenous street-
level groups based in al Anbar.  
Indications of Zarqawi’s declining status within the street-level ecology include 
the growing frequency of attacks against his network, concentrated in western al Anbar 
near al Qaim and in Baghdad, and a growing number of mass-executions of Zarqawi 
supporters, arranged in piles and in public view.220 In some ways, the encroachment of 
Zarqawi’s network has caused levels of resentment among local Iraqis surpassing that of 
coalition forces. His group’s tendency to confiscate cellular phones and weapons to 
prevent local subversion, as well as victimizing local residents through violence and theft, 
indicates a general level of disregard for the indigenous local population.221 Zarqawi’s 
organization is losing much of the critical local haven required for sustained street-level 
mobilization. This is demonstrated by the request of multiple tribal leaders based in 
Ramadi and al Qaim, centers of indigenous resistance, for assistance from U.S. forces in 
combating Zarqawi’s network in May 2005.222 It seems likely that this trend will 
continue until Zarqawi’s organization can reestablish effective local-level support by 
abandoning indiscriminate tactics and re-doubling attacks against symbols of occupation, 
such as Abu Ghraib prison.  
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Competition between VTEs and indigenous Islamic extremist groups is also 
impacting the behavior of insurgent groups, but in a less observable fashion. This 
competition has taken the form of a contest for prestige, as Zarqawi’s network attempts to 
reestablish its credibility after having been put to flight in Mosul and western al Anbar 
province in early 2005. The means of competition, indiscriminate terrorist bombings, has 
markedly increased levels of violence for those outside of Sunni controlled areas in al 
Anbar province and western Baghdad. This phase of competition probably began in early 
2005. The two prominent indigenous Islamic extremist groups, the Islamic Army of Iraq 
and the Army of Mujahideen decided immediately following the elections in January 
2005 to seek a limited truce with Baghdad in exchange for political participation. As 
such, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a campaign of high-intensity violence might 
increase the likelihood of a more favorable bargaining position with the predominantly 
Shiite government in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. This calculus is behind the 
dramatic increase in attacks mainly targeting police and government infrastructure in the 
first weeks after the election.  
The second increase in frequency and scale of attacks, in addition to the shift from 
government targets to high-density civilian areas, indicates the point at which Zarqawi’s 
network began its campaign to match and overtake the efforts of the locally-based 
groups. Other characteristics of the attacks verify the increased role of VTEs versus 
indigenous groups. For instance, the use of IEDs and VBIEDs has increased at a 
continuous rate due to effectiveness. April 2005 witnessed more VBIEDs than all of 2004 
combined, followed by an increase in May.223 VBIEDs account for more than sixty 
percent of all Iraqi police casualties as of June 2005.224 Notably, the number of suicide 
VBIEDs surpassed fifty percent of such attacks for the first time in April 2005. To date, 
the number of Iraqis involved in suicide operations has been negligible, while it is known 
that foreign nationals, especially Saudis and Palestinians, have accounted for a large 
portion of such incidents.225 The sudden rise of suicide VBIEDs over remotely-detonated 
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VBIEDs suggests that foreign elements are accounting for a larger proportion of this 
violence now than at the beginning of this campaign. This trend indicates that the 
escalation is likely due to an internal competition between indigenous and transnational 
insurgent groups, a potent force driving many aspects of the insurgent dynamic. 
In sum, the logic of competition is impacting the behavior of insurgent groups and 
increasing the overall level of insurgent violence. Competition in the present context is 
structured by the legacies of Hussein-era resource distribution and reflects the immediate 
goals of those groups that are active at the street-level: to establish, maintain, and enlarge 
local-level presence at the expense of other street-level groups. All other groups are 
viewed as potential or actual competitors in terms of capturing markets, local support, 
prestige, and other resources. The prevailing form of competition locally also reflects 
patterns of tribal vendetta, functioning as a mechanism to ensure collective responsibility 
and security. In the current phase, coalition forces have demonstrated a limited 
understanding of this emerging dynamic that is driving events at the street level, or of 
their place within it. These same forces account for the high levels of inter-group 
violence and factionalization that have been visible since the elections in January of 
2005. These cases demonstrate the impact of the competitive dynamic on insurgent 
behavior, and also suggest that by the end of this phase, the strategic role of U.S. forces 
may be altered from the current posture of pushing the opposing sides together, to 
keeping them apart. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
To date, significant aspects of the Sunni-led insurgency remain obscure. This 
chapter has identified several relevant factors regarding the genesis of and interactions 
between the most active and violent insurgent groups. This analysis specifically 
considered how and where these armed groups originated, the conditions that have 
facilitated their expansion, their current roles within the local setting, and how these roles 
are affecting the degree of Sunni-led violence. The first section of the chapter 
demonstrated how structural conditions within Iraqi society impact the current setting. 
The most prominent effect is first, the devolution of state authority to local-level groups 
that are comprised of genuine or artificially reconstructed tribal associations, and second, 
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the competitive calculus between and among local groups based on the distribution of 
scarce resources. Lastly, the emergence of local groups within a competitive, informal 
economic space has facilitated the expansion of a vibrant shadow economy. During each 
phase of this conflict, the position of locally-oriented armed groups has been solidified 
and expanded in manners consistent with the types and timing of the political 
opportunities available. The most significant of these opportunities has been identified as 
the slow reaction to security conditions in the aftermath of the invasion. The assessment 
of opportunities in later stages indicates that indigenous actors motivated in part by 
vendetta have gained in prominence, with a high degree of overlap between all violent 
groups and the shadow economy in the current phase. 
The analysis also indicates that insurgent groups are differentially placed to take 
advantage of developing opportunities for expansion. This disparity is primarily a 
function of group capabilities to mobilize and maintain effective mobilization structures. 
It has been shown that the two essential components of mobilization structures for groups 
active at the street-level relate to the properties of organizational form, and levels of 
connectivity with the broader environment. In terms of organizational form, each of the 
group-types exhibited similar tendencies to employ horizontal cell-based networked 
structures. With the possible exception of the core leadership of VTEs, each is also 
organized and recruited according to locally-oriented associations, either through 
extended family or communal ties. The degree of connectivity was shown to depend on 
the maintenance of links between the local population, state institutions, and other armed 
groups. The interactions between groups, particularly those that span from the street to 
the transnational levels, are one important indicator that a transition from industrial to 
information-age conflict is ongoing.  
This analysis suggests that the dynamics of competition have overshadowed the 
effects of anti-coalition violence in shaping the behavior of insurgent groups in the 
current stage of conflict. Competition in the present context is structured by the legacies 
of Hussein-era resource distribution and reflects the immediate goals of those groups that 
are active at the street-level: to establish, maintain, and enlarge local-level presence at the 
expense of other street-level groups. Within this competitive framework, all groups are 
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viewed as potential or actual competitors. This logic is affecting the behavior of insurgent 
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III. RETHINKING URBAN INSURGENCY: THE MODIFIED 
THIRD-GENERATION GANG MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What is driving the Sunni-led insurgency in Iraq? More than two years have 
passed since the removal of Saddam Hussein, yet there are few indications that the degree 
of Sunni-led violence will decline. On the contrary, violent activity has increased in 
frequency and scale over this period, and Pentagon assessments warn of substantially 
increased conflict continuing with the constitutional process, likely to extend until the 
spring of 2006.226 The case study presented in Chapter II demonstrated that the most 
active insurgent groups are animated by more than a hatred of freedom or a desire to 
incite general turmoil within Iraq, as some administration officials have asserted.227 The 
patterns and underlying dynamics of much of this violence are becoming increasingly 
discernable: the evolving characteristics of many armed groups are consistent with the 
3G2 model. This model suggests that armed groups function within a rationally bounded 
and organized space that is responsive to inputs affecting the calculus and outcomes of 
group behavior along certain expected trajectories. These inputs represent potential 
opportunities to minimize, deflect, or redirect the activities of armed groups if properly 
exploited, and suggest a domain of likely outcomes for group development.  
This chapter considers modifications to the 3G2 concept resulting from the Iraq 
case study in Chapter II, in addition to assessing the utility of an adapted 3G2 framework 
to the wider GWOT architecture outside of Iraq for terms of current commitments and 
potential future engagements. The first section of the chapter establishes an integrated 
3G2 framework by synthesizing elements of the existing model with the findings of the 
Iraq analysis. The second section considers the domain of likely outcomes articulated by 
this model by examining potential inputs and the effects of expected outcomes. Lastly, 
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this chapter frames the continued relevance of the 3G2 concept in terms of the GWOT 
threat environment. 
B. MODIFICATIONS TO THE 3G2 MODEL 
The 3G2 model is unique in its appreciation of the societal-level conditions 
affecting the development and orientation of armed groups, the political role that these 
groups embrace over time, and the relationships between groups that span the local, 
regional, and global levels of interaction. In general terms, the 3G2 concept is consistent 
with the results of the Iraq case analysis. However, the findings also complement or 
counter certain critical points insufficiently addressed by the existing model. This section 
presents the most significant results of the case study in terms of the analytical 
framework used in Chapter II. The findings of the Iraq case are then integrated into a 
modified 3G2 framework. 
1. Structural Conditions 
The model’s treatment of structural conditions is consistent with the societal-level 
forces impacting the growth and orientation of armed groups in Iraq. As suggested by the 
model, a complex array of associative networks predominates within the context of a 
state that is constrained by minimal capacity, poor economic performance, and significant 
social and political disparities. At the local-level, self-protecting solidarity groups are 
heavily engaged in the informal and criminal economies as the primary source of 
economic mobility. This position is analogous to the form and functions performed by 
street-level gangs as the basic element of the 3G2 concept. 
2. Political Opportunities 
Chapter II identifies certain features of insurgent groups that more clearly define 
the model. Specifically, I address the significance of political opportunities, the ways in 
which groups use them to their benefit, and the effects of locally-based political 
expansion. The case study shows that insurgent and criminal groups have expanded their 
political positions vis-à-vis the state through corruption and intimidation in accordance 
with the model. Further, the model posits that 3G2 actors themselves initiate this process 
for the purpose of establishing lawless areas and criminal enclaves or quasi-states. Yet 
the findings of the case study indicate that the roles of local groups and the state in this 
process are reversed. The incremental decline of the capacity and presence of the Iraqi 
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state, combined with the state-initiated scheme to retain power facilitated the expanded 
role of local-level groups. Greater political space was not only created across the 
spectrum of actors, but the state compelled local groups to fill the political and security 
vacuum produced by institutional retrenchment. In this way, sub-state and local actors 
were able to capture that political space already abdicated by the state. This is especially 
true in the aftermath of the US-led invasion, where nearly all of the available political 
space with the exception of state-level ministerial portfolios had been effectively 
abandoned to local forces.228 In this way, the extent of corruption and intimidation 
exercised by insurgent and criminal groups is a function of state retreat, reversing the 
logic of the model.  
The projected end-state of 3G2 development, the growth and proliferation of 
lawless criminal enclaves or quasi-states, is thus contingent upon poor state performance 
in terms of providing essential social, economic and security functions. In areas where 
localized quasi-state entities do not develop spontaneously, they may be encouraged to do 
so as a mechanism of rule, as witnessed in Iraq. In both cases, the quasi-state assumes the 
functions of providing security and access to resources locally. This is especially true of 
criminal quasi-states, known to favor a certain degree of stability and ever-increasing 
levels of market access.229 The competitive dynamic between these quasi-states ensures a 
status quo balance that preserves the structure of the declining state. The state structure 
persists not in spite of the proliferation of quasi-states, but precisely as a result of this 
process.230 Perhaps counter intuitively, the state itself is prolonged and less vulnerable to 
capture. This progression challenges the rationale of the model and suggests that these 
mechanisms have contributed to stability and security in Iraq in the absence of effective 
national government. 
3. Mobilization Structures 
The two components of group mobilization structures emphasized by the model 
are networked organizational form and the interactions between groups at varied levels of 
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analysis, both crucial properties of actors examined in the Iraq case. The insurgent and 
criminal groups identified in the case study exhibited some or all of the information-age 
organizational characteristics discussed in Chapter I, such as complex, dispersed, and 
technologically-driven cellular networks. As described by the model, this organizational 
form offers certain advantages in terms of communications, security, and the acquisition 
of resources that are contributing to the operational sustainability and effectiveness of 
groups in Iraq. Regarding the second component, the nature of external relationships, the 
trends discernable in the Iraq case highlight the properties of these interactions and 
clarify to a greater degree certain critical dynamics described by the model.  
First, the relationships between indigenous, locally-based groups and foreign-
based VTEs are characterized by a higher degree of violent competition than the 3G2 
framework depicts. The ability of groups positioned at the global, regional, and local 
spheres to establish and maintain connectivity with other groups in other levels remains a 
crucial determinant of mobilization capacity for actors across the spectrum in Iraq. The 
specific nature of the relationships between groups merits closer examination. The model 
posits that locally-oriented groups and transnational groups establish instrumental 
relationships codetermined by the political and economic ambitions of the respective 
parties. The underlying assumption is that both groups share an interest in greater market 
access and diminished state capacity to exercise territorial control within its national 
boundaries. This identity of interests binds the parties together to form a labor-
management relationship. This relationship provides the motive force behind the drive to 
capture or destroy the structure of the state. The results of the Iraq case verify that 
locally-based groups are benefiting from exchanges with transnational actors, however 
the relationships between these groups are far less deterministic than is depicted by the 
3G2 framework. It is evident that a certain level of ad hoc confluence of interests does 
indeed guide the interactions between local and transnational groups, although it is 
unclear that such limited cooperation approaches the degree of harmony that the model 
advocates.  
Rather, the Iraq case demonstrates that locally-oriented groups seek-out, maintain, 
and exploit relationships with transnational actors in order to guarantee their own 
operational sustainability. The relationships between VTE’s like Zarqawi’s organization 
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and indigenous Islamist and tribal groups demonstrates a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of the latter groups to promote the cause of the former. This is true despite 
evidence of exchange between the groups and the substantial incentives, at least in 
material terms, for mutual cooperation. The relative capability of each type of group 
partially clarifies this tendency. Reporting from al Anbar province indicates that groups 
are more inclined to assess their level of interaction with other actors based on the 
relative strength of their capabilities versus the perspective partner.231 While the model 
correctly assumes that both types of groups receive a clear advantage in capabilities from 
a closer relationship in absolute terms, local groups have been unlikely to collaborate 
within frameworks that do not balance or increase their capabilities relative to other 
groups, regardless of ideological or programmatic affinity or the amount of net gain.232 
This alters the dynamic of interaction described by the model, resulting in the pervasive 
competition between these two types of groups in particular, rather than interactions 
based on a confluence of interests as expected. 
In addition to relative degrees of capability, variations in capability-type are also 
affecting the interactions between groups positioned at different levels of analysis. The 
case study demonstrated that VTEs are more appropriately considered in terms of 
operational potential, while locally-based groups can be measured by actual operational 
capacity. Within the networked structure that joins the two groups, the locally-based 
component is the critical enabler that compels VTEs into the realm of sustained 
operational capacity from that of mere potential. In the case of Zarqawi’s organization, 
the seemingly inexhaustible supply of foreign volunteers willing to sacrifice themselves 
and their victims is misleading. Consider the rapid escalation of VBIED use in the 
months since April 2005. It is indisputable that there is rarely, if ever, such a thing as a 
ready-made suicide car-bomber. A successful suicide-attack represents the outcome of an 
organizationally intensive process involving the volunteers (sometimes unwilling) 
themselves, their handlers, those locating, selecting, and monitoring the appropriate 
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target, and those producing the explosive device.233 Additionally, the case study 
highlighted the complex network of supporters and sympathizers facilitating the transit of 
volunteers and materiel. In short, this tactic represents a corporate effort that is highly 
dependant on the local-level indigenous contribution in order to place “bombs on target” 
effectively. Without the local-level contribution, the VTE is constrained to the realm of 
potential versus actual capability, drastically reducing the sustainability and impact of 
VTE operations. While suicide and other VTE-led operations are media-savvy spectacles 
with substantial propaganda effects, in the balance of armed groups operating in Iraq, the 
VTE remains peripheral to the real strategic epicenter: locally-based and oriented kinship 
and solidarity groups. In this sense, the determination to target a VTE such as Zarqawi’s 
organization to the exclusion of other groups is misplaced.  
The Iraq case illuminates a second component of mobilization structure that is 
only briefly addressed by the model: the impact of group interaction with local 
populations. It has been shown in Chapter II that all groups seeking to establish or expand 
their street-level presence must establish effective connectivity with the local population. 
This is especially true of the locally-based group, and such interaction impacts 
relationships beyond the local-level in two ways: First, the disposition of the local 
populace affects the violent posture of locally-based groups relative to other groups. 
Second, the locally-based armed group maintains a vested interest, through the local 
population, in preserving the structure of the state. The reactive profile of local Iraqi 
groups has been described in Chapter II, briefly restated as the tendency to act as a force 
of social conservation and to violently defend community perceptions of the status quo. 
The effects of this role contribute to the assessment of relative capabilities described 
above in establishing group relationships with potential allies and competitors. When a 
local population exhibits sympathy or indifference to the activities or encroachment of an 
outside armed group, the potential for competition or collaboration becomes largely a 
function of capabilities. When outside-group relationships with the community 
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deteriorate, the affinity ties that remain latent in the absence of conflict234 are activated, 
and the locally-based group will adopt a posture of hostility as a matter of course, 
regardless of the balance of capabilities.  
The second effect of this degree of interaction is evident by the interest of locally-
based armed groups in preserving state structures. The case study indicated that insurgent 
groups have skillfully cultivated sympathizers and positioned active members and 
supporters within local, municipal, and even ministerial-level institutions located in 
Baghdad and al Anbar province. This degree of infiltration highlights the significance of 
state-access to local-level mobilization. Locally-based groups tend to maintain some level 
of connectivity with the state in order to provide access to resources through patronage 
links, fulfilling one element of the exchange relationship guaranteeing community 
allegiance. If these links are jeopardized, the ability of the group to sustain its position 
within the community, and hence maintain mobilization capacity, is also jeopardized. In 
this way, there is very strong incentive to preserve the state structure in order to guarantee 
access to state-specific resources such as official employment, distribution of subsidies 
and revenues, and especially foreign aid.235 The position of armed groups relative to local 
populations affects the 3G2 model by more clearly bounding the local-level competitive 
dynamic and conditioning inter-group interactions, although the model’s essential logic 
remains unchanged.   
In sum, the principles of the 3G2 concept are largely consistent with the results of 
the Iraq case analysis, although some of the limitations of the current framework have 
been highlighted in the previous sections. The model adequately considers the societal-
level conditions affecting group orientation and development, but the mechanisms by 
which a group achieves political prominence and its relationship to the external 
environment are more clearly defined. First, declines in state capacity and institutional 
retrenchment impel local-level criminal and insurgent groups into the political sphere. 
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Second, the competition accompanying this process ensures that the functions and 
structures of the state will be preserved, rather than destroyed. Third, relationships 
between armed groups remain essential components of mobilization capacity, but local 
groups are the primary enabler and strategic locus, and they seek organizational survival 
as their primary interest. Lastly, local populations play a role in determining the 
orientation and extent of the competitive drive that challenges the state. These points 
reflect the critical junctures for developing an adapted framework that integrates the 
findings from Chapter II with the existing 3G2 concept. 
C. INPUTS AND EFFECTS 
How do the modifications suggested by the integrated structural 3G2 model affect 
the domain of outcomes which the model anticipated? The question is particularly 
relevant given current developments by insurgent groups in Iraq. The integrated model 
suggests that first, insurgent-group activity can be viewed as a cumulative effect of the 
structural forces prevalent in Iraq. The choice to engage in violence is one element of a 
strategic rationale informed by conditions of scarcity and the functions armed groups 
perform locally. This rationale also shapes the competitive dynamic that drives political 
and economic expansion. Second, the behavior of locally-based armed groups can be 
affected by manipulating societal and local-level factors, the most significant of which 
are: state-level economic conditions, the openness of the legitimate political sphere, and 
the externalities of entrepreneurial competition. Finally, these and other inputs into the 
framework can be expected to generate certain outcomes within a limited domain that 
defines the likely end-state of group evolution from the street-level. The first part of this 
section examines those inputs that are likely to generate the most significant reductions of 
insurgent activity according to the model. The second half considers the inputs already 
affecting the conflict in Iraq, and presents the domain of likely outcomes for insurgent 
development. 
1. The Modified 3G2 Framework: Inputs to Reduce Insurgent Violence 
Inputs showing the greatest potential to diminish insurgent activity include state-
led structural modification, the formation of elite consensus, and the indirect engagement 
of insurgent groups. State-led structural modification pertains explicitly to the national-
level economic setting. As highlighted in Chapters I and II, Iraq’s current economic 
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policies are legacies of the CPA period of rule intended to develop a thriving, free market 
economy. These policies reflect much of the reform agenda commonly known as the 
Washington Consensus, emphasizing fiscal discipline, re-prioritization of public 
expenditures, privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation, foreign direct investment, 
property rights, and good governance in general.236 To date, many of these reforms are 
only partially or haphazardly in place, contributing to the expansion of the vibrant 
informal and shadow economies at the expense of formal sector development.237  
Greater emphasis can be placed on limiting the growth of these informal and 
criminal economies, which are easily captured by combatants. In some cases, the 
adjustments necessary to address this question may stray from the Washington Consensus 
agenda, in other cases not. In general terms, structural modifications bear results in the 
medium-long term. For instance, endemic corruption and stalled foreign-direct 
investment are reversible, but significant progress in these areas is unlikely in the near-
term. However, more flexible, immediate-term responses are possible. The first of these 
relates to adjusting the system of price controls that are strengthening the shadow 
economy. For instance, the gasoline and food subsidies currently in place contribute more 
to thriving black markets that subsidize insurgent violence than to their intended 
purpose.238 By replacing these subsidies with cash vouchers, a substantial portion of the 
shadow economy can be limited, while contributing to formal sector growth.239 A second 
course of action immediately available to Iraqi administrators is to re-introduce many of 
the state-based social services famously attributed to the classic “rentier” state,240 with 
emphasis placed on slowing or reversing the impetus to join the informal and shadow 
economies. These measures would significantly undercut street-level mobilization 
structures by co-opting the functions of tribal and sub-tribal groups, while diminishing 
the pull of the shadow economy which fuels insurgent activity. 
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The forging of elite consensus is the second potential input affecting the model. 
Consensus within the elite establishment fosters the conditions of political inclusion that 
will moderate political grievances and diminish insurgent activity. Elite consensus in this 
sense signifies the basic acknowledgement by the various elite factions that greater Sunni 
participation in the legitimate political sphere is an inevitability to be reckoned with. As 
such, the more rapidly violent Sunni groups are engaged and enticed into the legitimate 
political process, en masse, the earlier their campaign of anti-system violence will 
subside. Insurgency theory emphasizes that the offer of substantial political incentives in 
this way accounts for the greatest prospective solution to reducing both “national” and 
“liberation” insurgent violence in the near-term. Rather than attempting to constrain or 
deny the ambitions of local armed Sunni groups, the Shiite guardians of the legitimate 
government can deflect the expanding political power of local level leaders by vigorously 
absorbing them within the ranks of the developing Iraqi state. This process follows the 
essential logic of state-led structural modifications, wherein the expanding political 
power of local-level leaders can be co-opted or redirected by manipulating those 
constraints highlighted by the model. By forging the requisite elite consensus that 
expands legitimate political opportunities for Sunni participation, the mobilization 
structures of insurgent groups can be undercut while simultaneously strengthening the 
legitimate political establishment in the near-term. 
In contrast, the third input suggested by the model, the indirect engagement of 
insurgent groups, does not alter or balance the conditions that contribute to insurgent 
activity. Rather, this factor exploits these conditions and their effects in order to diminish 
the capabilities of armed groups. Indirect engagement refers specifically to modes of 
confrontation reflective of a law-enforcement, minimum use of force paradigm as in the 
Italian case described in Chapter I. Insurgent groups are thus engaged “indirectly” 
through the vigorous use of intelligence, infiltration, and policing. The virtue of the 
indirect approach is its correspondence to the competitive logic of the model, or more 
appropriately, to the effects of this competition relative to the insurgent groups 
themselves. The competitive effects that bear the greatest negative impact to participants 
are the stresses associated with rivalry and expansion, most significantly by producing 
internal vulnerabilities. Stress is a result of hostile pressure from competitors and the 
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rapid pace of entrepreneurial activity. Groups subject to intense pressure from 
encroaching rivals are known to decentralize, often exacerbating existing fissures 
between internal rivals and interests.241 Groups that become stressed and destabilized in 
this fashion are especially vulnerable to penetration by intelligence forces through 
collaboration and infiltration.242  
Armed groups that experience rapid expansion in membership or capabilities also 
risk this type of infiltration, in addition to a second vulnerability based on consolidating 
or expanding market presence in the shadow and informal sectors. The black markets 
based on petrol and food subsidies demonstrate this effect. In order to maximize revenue, 
profiteers must develop the necessary resource base to respond to dynamic market 
conditions. This requires the accumulation of materiel assets, such as fuel tankers to 
distribute stolen petrol, or physical infrastructure such as warehouses to store stockpiles 
of food. As levels of infrastructure increase in proportion to the requirements of 
continued economic success, the orientation of group resources turns toward protecting 
and enhancing these holdings at the expense of operational considerations.243 The effects 
of this process are two-fold: First, the dependency of armed groups on physical 
infrastructure diffuses the advantages of highly adaptable, networked organizational 
structure. For example, the tendency of gasoline smugglers to employ small flotillas of 
container ships for transshipment offers an opportunity to physically target and deny 
resources that undoubtedly contribute to insurgent groups. Second, the accumulation of 
resources becomes a point of internal contention, as competing interests surface regarding 
the distribution of collective resources that will best serve the group and its members.244 
Conflict over resources is thus a second destabilizing factor, increasing the vulnerability 
of the group to infiltration or the collaboration of disaffected elements.   
 
 
                                                 
241 Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie and Rockliff. 1960), 114. 
242 David Brotherton and Luis Barrios, The Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), 304. 
243 Elizabeth Picard, “The Political Economy of Civil War in Lebanon, in Steven Hydeman, ed. War, 
Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East, 310. 
244 Ibid. 
80
2. Expected Outcomes of Observed Trends 
The preceding section examined those potential inputs that yielded the greatest 
decline of insurgent capabilities as an outcome of the modified 3G2 framework. Each 
condition was intended to diminish insurgent potential and manipulate the competitive 
dynamic to the advantage of the state. In practice, a wide range of inputs is already 
affecting the progression of events in Iraq, making the assessment of which inputs are 
likely to produce particular outcomes a complex undertaking. For this reason, the same 
three indicators (structural conditions, elite consensus, and engagement of insurgent 
groups) are examined in this section in terms of the results of the Chapter II analysis. The 
expected outcomes described at the end of this section identify the likely trajectories of 
insurgent-group evolution. 
Having shown in the previous section what measures can positively affect the 
structural outlook in Iraq, the actual conditions are somewhat less encouraging. Current 
indications suggest that the informal and shadow sectors will continue to dominate the 
economic landscape in the near-medium term,245 and will likely grow as the markets 
associated with insurgent violence expand. The criminal economies based on theft, 
weapons trading, mercenary kidnappings, black-market smuggling and arbitrage that 
have become a cornerstone of insurgent mobilization will continue to operate with very 
few constraints, and will likely increase in proportion to increasing levels of violence. 
Armed groups can be expected to prolong and intensify violent competition as long as the 
prospects of continued access to individual and collective revenues from the shadow 
economy are guaranteed.246 Should competition escalate to the extent that the prospects 
for continued resources are in some way jeopardized, armed groups can be expected to 
explore options for alliance building or some other means to ensure the future absence of 
material causes for conflict.247 In the current phase, competition is actually fueling the 
expansion of the underground economy in addition to the increased appropriation of 
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market segments by combatants.248 In this sense, the likelihood of street-level 
competition limiting market access or restricting growth in the near term is minimal. 
Accordingly, when viewed in the context of the 3G2 model, the structural setting 
presently observed in Iraq suggests the continuous and unconstrained expansion of 
insurgent group capabilities well into the future. 
Similarly, the degree of elite consensus is not likely to increase until well after the 
end of the constitutional process, suggesting a low probability that any of the armed 
Sunni groups will be welcomed into the legitimate political process. In addition, the 
strength of elite consensus building is increasingly contingent upon levels of insurgent 
violence,249 which is expected to escalate dramatically in the coming months. One 
significant factor limiting the formation of stronger elite consensus is the increasingly 
vocal unwillingness of Shiite leaders to accept the possibility of establishing dialogue 
with armed Sunni groups,250 to say nothing of the prospects of full political participation. 
In one sense, Shiite political elites have constructed a strategic dead-end in which they 
are now cornered. By publicly denouncing all those who negotiate with the Sunni 
insurgent groups, they raise the stakes for their own inevitable negotiation with these 
groups at the point when their rising political prominence makes entrance into the 
political sphere unavoidable. This climate of mutual hostility has prolonged and 
intensified the political stalemate that further impedes the emergence of the necessary 
political incentives described in the preceding section. Because the degree of 
factionalization among the elite establishment is rising and few substantial incentives are 
likely in this phase of conflict, there is little indication that the political role of armed 
Sunni groups will diminish. Conversely, the output of the model suggests that these 
factors in combination favor a steady increase in the political prominence of such groups 
over time. 
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The third condition again considers how the engagement of insurgent groups 
affects the domain of expected outcomes. The methods of engagement most predominant 
in Iraq differ fundamentally from those treated by the model in the preceding section. 
These methods are characterized by the direct military confrontation of insurgent groups 
through the use of decisive, overwhelming force as described in Chapter II. This is 
partially due to the belief in many quarters that the insurgency can be “beaten” or 
“destroyed” through direct, armed confrontation.251 Insurgency theory supports this view 
in certain contexts, as in the case of Argentina. Notably, the Argentine case pitted a 
competent national security apparatus of some 60,000 well-trained and equipped soldiers 
against less than five thousand insurgents that functioned largely in consolidated blocs.252 
In contrast, the Iraq case situates a skeletal state and an occupying army against tens of 
thousands of dispersed irregulars, with hundreds of thousands in sympathy or direct 
material support. While these discrepancies are purely numerical, the qualitative 
disparities between the current context and the Argentine case are not insubstantial. Other 
successful cases of direct military confrontation inform current US preferences. 
Experiences from El Salvador are often highlighted as useful guides for 
counterinsurgency in Iraq. The Salvadorian model has inspired the recent creation of 
commando-style units that directly target and engage insurgent groups.253 These units 
reportedly number approximately 10,000 Iraqis, and coalition security assessments 
indicate that further recruitment and the reorientation of some existing units according to 
this model can be expected.254  
The direct approach is an attractive counterinsurgency option for strategic 
planners, as it tends to yield immediate results in the form of overwhelming tactical and 
operational successes. More relevant to the Iraq case, the direct approach is preferred 
because in many cases it is the only available option. Despite steady progress in the 
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recruitment and training of Iraqi police, domestic intelligence and law enforcement 
capabilities are unequal to the level of proficiency demanded by the model of indirect 
engagement detailed in the preceding section. The example of petrol smuggling is again 
useful. Even in cases where intelligence has identified a smuggling operation in progress, 
police units are generally outmanned, outgunned, and outmaneuvered to such an extent 
that the prospects of containing these groups through a police-led domestic intelligence 
approach are minimal.255  
Unsurprisingly, direct military engagement yields a set of expected outcomes that 
varies substantially from those favored by the indirect approach. While the intelligence-
based paradigm seeks to capitalize on the effects of competition, the use of direct force 
contributes to the competitive drive that has been shown to increase insurgent capabilities 
and intensify levels of violence. Within the context of the 3G2 model, the effects of direct 
engagement by COIN forces are analogous to those of encroachment by any rival street-
level contender. Pressure on insurgent groups from sustained violent confrontation yields 
the stress and destabilization that are positive outcomes when identified and exploited 
through intelligence. The decentralization that normally corresponds to such periods of 
high stress favors the emergence of more extreme elements from within the organization. 
The frequency and scale of bloodshed increases during this period of stress as emerging 
elements seek to assert their violent credentials.256 In this way, the model suggests that 
the relative calm immediately following an armed confrontation between coalition forces 
and insurgent groups is a misleading indicator of success. Perhaps counter intuitively, the 
expected outcome of this type of confrontation is a net increase in the level of violence 
over time. Within the competitive dynamic of the model, escalating levels of violence 
drive those conditions identified as favoring the relative expansion of insurgent 
capabilities, such as the expansion of combat economies, decline of elite consensus, and 
growth of local-level support. In this way, the expected outcome of direct military 
engagement is the continued expansion of insurgent capabilities and popular support. 
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The expected outcomes described in this section indicate a strengthening of 
insurgent groups in the near-medium term. Certain trajectories of development are also 
suggested that describe the future roles of insurgent groups relative to the coalition and 
Iraqi state. First, the tendency of insurgent groups to capture sectors of the growing 
informal and criminal economies will increase. This, in combination with the growing 
political stature of armed groups and a liberalizing Iraqi state favors some type of 
criminal enclavization or quasi-state development in parallel to legitimate state-
structures. Second, armed groups will function as the shadow or de facto governments 
within these enclaves, providing the services and performing the tasks reflective of their 
local-orientation. Third, the structure of the legitimate Iraqi state will survive and may 
even thrive in those areas outside of insurgent influence. Fourth, coalition pressure will 
facilitate and increase the rate of these processes. Lastly, the conditions that can slow or 
reverse this progression are state-led structural adjustment, the forging of elite consensus, 
and the indirect engagement of insurgent groups. In short, locally-oriented armed groups 
can be expected to expand from the street to the sub-national level, evolving from 
mutually protective solidarity groups into prominent political and economic actors. 
D. APPLICABILITY OF THE 3G2 FRAMEWORK IN THE GLOBAL WAR 
ON TERRORISM  
While Iraq is officially cast as the central front in the U.S.-initiated Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT),257 the military component of this effort has been underway since the 
fall of 2001 in a variety of capacities around the world. This section considers the utility 
of the adapted 3G2 framework within the larger GWOT threat environment, and frames 
the continued relevance of the model to conflicts on the horizon. The first segment 
examines official assessments of the objectives and end-state of the GWOT campaign 
with emphasis placed on the role of military operations. The second half considers the 
applicability of the model in the context of ongoing and potential future GWOT 
operations.      
1. Bounding the GWOT  
Deriving a coherent conceptual model of U.S. strategic posture in the post 9/11 
context has become no less complex nearly four years after the fact. Broadly speaking, 
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the available strategic guidance offers a vague formulation of potential threats and the 
context in which they exist. By examining the variety of official assessments that 
comprise this guidance, it is possible to construct a representation of the objectives and 
conditions for victory in this global campaign. The State Department provides the first 
step in this process, by defining terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”258 One notes from the above that 
“terrorism” is described more as a tactic or a concept, and less so as an enemy against 
which a war can be waged. The National Security Strategy released in 2002 notes 
unequivocally that “the enemy is terrorism,”259 although follow-on documents such as 
the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism more narrowly define the opposition as 
“terrorists and their organizations.”260  
This same document also presents objectives and conditions for victory in the 
global campaign. The primary goals are to “stop terrorist attacks against the US, its 
citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world,”261 and to create an 
international environment inhospitable to terrorism. Victory will have been achieved 
when terrorism has been reduced from a serious global threat to an “unorganized, 
localized, non-sponsored, [and] rare”262 occurrence restricted to the sub-state criminal 
level, although the indicators of this final stage are ill-defined. Other documents, such as 
the President’s Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism offer some metrics for 
identifying the final state of victory, which is achieved by “ridding the world of those 
who seek to destroy our freedom and way of life.”263 It can be inferred that victory in 
these cases means limiting the activities of terrorists groups to an acceptable threshold of 
violence, which is the interpretation of victory adopted for the remainder of this study. 
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2. Structure of the GWOT Threat Environment and the Applicability of 
the Model 
While the objectives and end-state of the GWOT merit further official scrutiny, 
the interim strategy for limiting the activities of terrorist groups is comparatively well-
defined. The administration has conceptualized the terrorist threat environment as a three-
tiered structure comprised of the international, regional, and sub-national levels.264 
Groups at each level are characterized as highly flexible networked actors, attuned to the 
advantages of information-age technologies. Actors are portrayed as mutually reinforcing 
groups that support each other through resources and ideological commitment, creating 
synergistic effects between each level.265 Locally-oriented groups are characterized as 
low-threat potential, while the opposite is true of global networks like al Qaida. The 
strategy developed in response seeks to “compress the scope and capabilities” of terrorist 
organizations, isolate them regionally, and destroy them at the sub-state level.266 
Although not overtly stated, the implication of the strategy is that international 
organizations such as al Qaida are the primary focus of this campaign. However, the 
strategy also emphasizes that the regional and sub-state levels are the favored settings for 
kinetic operations. This quality reflects the administration’s intent to offensively engage 
terrorist organizations as far away from U.S. soil as possible, or to “take the fight to the 
enemy.”267 
The 3G2 model accounts for the essential conditions that comprise this threat 
environment. The utility of the 3G2 model as a conceptual tool within the specific 
context of Iraq has been demonstrated in previous sections. The model retains this 
applicability within the wider GWOT setting as the basic units of analysis (networked 
criminal actors) crucial linking mechanisms (markets), logic of interaction (competition), 
and language of exchange (violence) are not altered by context. The model complements 
the counter-terrorism strategy’s focus on “identifying, locating, and destroying terrorist 
                                                 
264 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: February 
2003), 7. 
265 Ibid, 8. 
266 Ibid, 17. 
267 Gerry J. Gilmore, “Bush: 'We will take the fight to the enemy,’” American Forces Press Service, 2 
June 2004, < http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123007868 > (7/21/2005). 
 
87
groups”268 in their domestic settings by emphasizing local-level enablers as the strategic 
locus within the complex web of interconnected actors. The significance of the local 
component is widely recognized in Afghanistan and the Philippines, as commanders 
endeavor to limit the saliency of insurgent violence within the local population and 
constrain the activities of locally-based and transnational terrorist enterprises such as Abu 
Sayyaf and al Qaida.269 Victory as an output of the 3G2 framework is largely contingent 
upon the disposition of local-level actors, although this does not obscure the influence of 
interaction with transnational groups positioned within the broader conflict environment. 
The utility of the model is due in part to its recognition of these crucial linking 
mechanisms, in addition to an appreciation of the constraints and vulnerabilities 
confronting these groups when active at the regional and sub-state levels. 
At present, the GWOT remains imprecisely bounded in terms of concrete, 
measurable objectives and projected end-states. Until such time as this developing 
strategic posture is more clearly defined, the essential component will remain combating 
terrorist networks and organizations around the world. Continuation as such is not a 
matter of speculation, as congressional assessments indicate that a second iteration of this 
global campaign lurks on the horizon. While Iraq will likely remain the epicenter of 
GWOT operations into the foreseeable future, the scope of the U.S.-led initiative is 
broadening to include Central Asia, South East Asia and the Horn of Africa as potential 
sites of broadened engagement. Terrorist groups at each level of analysis are known to 
maintain a significant presence in these regions and to enjoy relative freedom of 
movement in locations such as Indonesia, Yemen, Somalia, and the border regions of the 
Ferghana Valley. In spite of the variable threat pictures presented by each of these 
settings, the 3G2 framework may still provide a useful conceptual tool for assessing 
influential actors, the forces that shape their behavior, and the prospects for victory. 
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The patterns and underlying dynamics of the violence confronting U.S forces in 
Iraq are becoming more discernable, and the 3G2 model offers a useful analytical tool for 
assessing the roles and influence of prominent actors within this evolving threat 
environment. Evidence emerging from Iraq can be used to refine certain aspects of the 
existing model to better reflect the nature of interactions between armed groups and their 
prospects for evolution from the street-level. An adapted 3G2 framework incorporates 
these conditions by recognizing that first, declines in state capacity and institutional 
retrenchment impel local-level criminal and insurgent groups into the political sphere. 
Second, the competition accompanying this process ensures that the functions and 
structures of the state will be preserved, rather than destroyed. Third, relationships 
between armed groups remain essential components of mobilization capacity, but local 
groups are the primary enabler and strategic locus, and they seek organizational survival 
as their primary interest. Lastly, local populations play a role in determining the 
orientation and extent of the competitive drive that challenges the state.  
The implications of this adapted framework for locally-oriented groups are two-
fold: First, the choice to engage in violence is one element of a strategic rationale 
informed by conditions of scarcity and the functions armed groups perform locally. 
Second, the capabilities of locally-based armed groups can be affected by manipulating 
societal and local-level factors, the most significant of which are: state-level economic 
conditions, the openness of the legitimate political sphere, and the effects of competition 
between rivals. When the results of the Iraq case are considered in this context, the 
expected outcome is that local groups will expand from the street to the sub-national 
level, evolving from mutually protective solidarity groups into prominent de facto 
political and economic actors. The fate of Iraq, while significant, represents only a 
portion of the broader strategic context guiding U.S. efforts. At present, much of this 
context is unknown or vaguely defined, however it is certain that U.S. forces will be 
engaging terrorist organizations and networks within this context in the coming years and 
decades. Strategy dictates that much of this effort will be confined to the regional and 





Despite the proclamations of bureaucrats, there are few indications that the Sunni-
led insurgency is in its “last throes.”270 To the contrary, the degree and intensity of 
insurgent violence is increasing and this trend is likely to continue. Coalition forces 
confronting this challenge have been thrust into an environment of great uncertainty. 
Troops on the ground are facing a variety of threats from across the spectrum of violent 
actors. The different motivations and relationships between these groups are gradually 
emerging. Indigenous and transnational actors are establishing links and magnifying their 
capabilities in ways that are consistent with the rapidly changing information-age 
environment. The traditional distinctions between violent groups seeking political goals 
and those pursuing profit are becoming blurred. This ambiguity challenges strategic 
planners to develop new models for insurgent group behavior and the appropriate role of 
military force in the contemporary setting. 
B. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND URBAN INSURGENCY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 
Historically, insurgencies are more likely to fall short of their stated goals than to 
succeed.271 Yet even in cases of successful repression or mediation, insurgency can still 
pose challenges for governments in enforcing policies. The cases in this study 
demonstrate the evolving characteristics of insurgency and state response since the 
immediate aftermath of World War II. Early examples of industrial-age insurgencies in 
Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus highlight the importance of developing long-term political 
incentives and social reforms, effectively undercutting the ability of insurgent organizers 
to mobilize recruits and popular support. This proved especially difficult in Cyprus and in 
other cases where insurgents demanded complete liberation from foreign occupation, and 
colonial authorities were unwilling to comply. This study has shown that in cases of 
liberation insurgency, a political ideology that resonates among the population is 
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unnecessary to capture popular support as long as resentment of foreign presence remains 
widespread. In these cases, an insurgency may be reduced to an acceptable level of 
violence and disruption, but without a probability of totally defeating the insurgency.  
The cases of Italy and Argentina demonstrate the changing properties of 
insurgency and state-response in the post-colonial era. In both examples, insurgents 
waged urban-oriented campaigns against indigenous governments, exploited considerable 
trans-border connectivity, and enjoyed substantial domestic and international support. 
The divergent methods of state response that in both cases successfully repressed 
insurgent violence demonstrate the utility of military and law enforcement approaches in 
relation to the evolving nature of insurgent behavior. The Italian authorities conducted a 
national COIN campaign between 1978 and 1982, based on the traditional law-
enforcement minimum-force paradigm. Military, intelligence, and administration 
functions were centralized under a unified command, and the regular military supported 
law-enforcement as needed. Operations were conducted in accordance with national 
legislation, with clearly identified structures of authority and oversight.  
In contrast, the Argentine government relied on a “war” paradigm that mobilized 
the national military and security apparatus against entire segments of the country. The 
Argentine case offers a useful demonstration of the negative social costs of waging this 
type of COIN campaign. Beginning in 1975 and lasting until 1983, the Argentine 
government employed special commando units and paramilitary death squads to 
“disappear”272 suspected subversives, although the insurgency itself had been effectively 
neutralized by 1979. Operations were conducted informally or beyond channels of 
accountability and scrutiny. This institutionalization of extra-legal repression on a 
national scale engendered profound social and ideological cleavages that remain a 
persistent and divisive feature of Argentine society more than twenty years later. Both the 
Argentine and Italian approaches were successful over approximately five years; however 
it is uncertain whether the long-term social and political costs associated with the war 
paradigm make this a desirable or feasible option in the contemporary context.   
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The challenges of the Italian and Argentine cases are magnified by the effects of 
the information revolution. As this study showed, much of the industrial-age model must 
be reconceptualized in order to reflect emerging realities of the information-age. 
Technological advancements are inducing shifts in the organizational form and 
capabilities of violent groups, as information-age theories of low-intensity conflict 
demonstrate.. Netwar theory shows that the information revolution favors networked 
forms of organization and information technologies for the determination of both 
character and outcome of the conflict. Further, the traits of information-age protagonists 
differ markedly from their industrial-age counterparts. Their organization is more 
diffused and dispersed. This shift is evident among emerging violent non-state actors, 
who exploit advances in communications technology to mobilize and avoid detection. 
The gradual transition of insurgencies from rural to urban settings compounds the 
advantages of non-state groups that capitalize on proximity and the accessibility of 
resources in densely populated areas.  
The 3G2 model builds on this foundation by identifying relationships between 
violent urban-based networked actors. Managing insurgent activity in the contemporary 
urban battlespace entails recognizing a new type of violent non-state actor: politicized 
and technologically savvy urban gangs. These groups extend their presence from the 
street to the national level through information-age capabilities and organizational design. 
They take advantage of relationships with VTEs to pursue criminal and political 
objectives that challenge the authority and sovereignty of the state. Gang theory shows 
how these groups mobilize to sustain operations and how they interact at the local level. 
Most importantly, gang theory shows that street-level groups occupy a formal role within 
their local communities; they are not autonomous organizations that exist in isolation. 
Street-gangs are linked to the environment that sustains them, and this link is strongest 
with the local population. Gangs are dependent on sustained interaction with the local 
population, and this relationship partially determines patterns of gang activity. 
C. LESSONS FROM THE IRAQ CASE FINDINGS 
The case study of the Sunni-led insurgency examines the behavior and 
development of insurgent groups for patterns that are consistent with the 3G2 model. The 
case study shows how structural conditions within Iraqi society, the political 
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opportunities available to armed groups, and the mobilization structures that these groups 
employ are affecting the current setting. The most prominent structural effect is first, the 
devolution of state authority to local-level groups that are comprised of reconstructed 
tribal associations, and second, the competitive calculus between local groups based on 
the distribution of scarce resources. The emergence of local groups within a competitive, 
informal economic space has facilitated the expansion of a vibrant shadow economy.  
The position of locally-oriented armed groups has been solidified and expanded 
consistent with the political opportunities available. The delayed response to deteriorating 
security conditions in the aftermath of the invasion has been identified as the most 
significant of these opportunities. While the U.S. role in shaping insurgent behavior at 
that stage should not be overstated, the findings here suggest that the prior period of U.S. 
enforced sanctions are strongly linked to the structural outcomes contributing to insurgent 
activity. The devolution of authority and expansion of the shadow economy began during 
the Iran-Iraq War, due to critical shortages in manpower and resources. The scale of both 
processes was magnified by the sanctions regime. The formal sector declined and the 
enforcement capacity of the state became depended on local clients. At the time of the 
U.S. invasion, the size of the informal and shadow economies and the stature of local-
level groups reflected the constraints of the sanctions period. In this sense, it is reasonable 
to suggest that U.S. policy – the sanctions – shaped the conditions that now benefit the 
organizers of the insurgency.    
I also examined here how a dynamic of street-level competition is affecting inter-
group interaction and insurgent violence. Each group that is active locally views all other 
groups as potential or actual competitors for influence and resources. Each then pursues 
the identical immediate goals of establishing, maintaining, or enlarging a local-level 
presence to the detriment of the remaining groups. The most visible manifestation of this 
calculus arises in the form of the tribal vendetta. Inter-group conflict may adopt the form 
of revenge-based tribal violence. Just as the traditional notion of a “tribe” was 
appropriated by the Ba’th regime and re-defined for political ends, the tribal vendetta has 
been de-linked from its cultural tradition. Inter-tribal violence should not be removed 
from the current context of market-based rivalry and instead interpreted through a 
traditionalist lens. Tribal vendetta is firmly rooted in a competitive rationale based on 
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unequal distribution of resources and interests. By categorizing street-level violence as a 
function of tribal vendetta, crucial linkages to the competitive dynamic and relevant 
trends in local political alignment are obscured.  
Competition accounts for the high levels of intra-insurgency violence and 
factionalization that have been visible since the elections in January of 2005. The 
deterioration of the relationships between VTEs and local tribal groups based in al Anbar 
province is the most visible manifestation of such intra-insurgency rivalry. Less visibly, 
competition between VTEs and indigenous Islamic extremist groups is substantially 
affecting levels of insurgent violence. These events cannot be understood with the 
framework generally applied to the Iraqi case of a constant tribal and anti-American 
inspired insurgency. In the case of the former, the heavy-handed encroachment of 
Zarqawi’s network into the heartland of the indigenous resistance has inspired vigorous 
opposition from local armed groups.  The tendency of Zarqawi’s supporters to prey on 
local populations in al Anbar province and western Baghdad has fostered discontent 
among ordinary Iraqis. Populations are victimized through arbitrary violence and theft, 
inspiring levels of resentment that in some cases surpasses that of coalition forces. The 
general disregard for indigenous Iraqis has invited fierce local resistance, and has 
weakened the position of Zarqawi’s organization at the street-level. Violent exchanges 
between these groups are generally confined to insurgent-controlled areas, thus the effect 
on the overall level of violence is minimal.  
The latter case is primarily a contest for prestige. Indigenous Islamic extremist 
groups have initiated the dramatic escalation of violence following the January elections, 
possibly in an effort to secure a more favorable position for negotiation with the new 
Shiite-dominated government. Zarqawi’s network initiated a campaign to match and 
overtake the efforts of locally-based groups, attempting to reassert its presence in the 
aftermath of the elections and eviction from northern Iraq. The use of indiscriminate 
bombings has dramatically increased levels of violence against those outside of Sunni 
controlled areas in al Anbar province and western Baghdad. These attacks persist despite 
determined efforts by the coalition and their Iraqi counterparts to pressure armed groups 
and contain the effects of insurgent violence. 
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D. MODIFICATIONS TO THE GANG MODEL  
The Sunni-led insurgency poses a challenge for strategic planners because the 
disposition of armed groups and the effect of coalition operations have been difficult to 
assess. Yet more patterns and underlying dynamics of insurgent behavior are becoming 
apparent. In general terms, the evolving characteristics of many armed groups are 
consistent with the model of development specified by the 3G2 framework. Certain 
critical elements of the model can be expanded and refined, incorporating the Iraq 
example. The model adequately considers the societal-level constructs affecting group 
orientation and development, but the Iraq case more clearly defines the mechanisms by 
which a group achieves political prominence, and its relationship to the broader conflict 
environment.  
First, declining state capacity and institutional retrenchment pull local-level 
criminal and insurgent groups into the political sphere. Second, the competition 
accompanying this process ensures that the functions and structures of the state will be 
preserved, rather than destroyed. This reverses the logic of the model, by which the 
appearance and proliferation of armed groups spur a process of state deterioration. The 
expansion of these groups at the local level indicates that the state is underperforming in 
the critical areas of social, economic, and security obligations. To identify this process as 
a threat to the stability and security of the state is only a partial recognition of the larger 
situation. By considering the effects on the state in isolation, the most reasonable course 
of action is to rely on enforcement mechanisms to resolve tensions, defending the status 
quo. This explains the willingness of the Iraqi government to cast insurgent groups as a 
vital security threat, justifying the current governing arrangement as a bulwark against 
impending chaos. This tendency obscures the broader relational context that links the 
state to local populations and the armed groups that they support.  
Third, relationships between armed groups remain essential components of 
mobilization capacity, but local groups are the primary enabler and strategic locus, and 
they seek organizational survival as their primary interest. Local groups are unlikely to 
collaborate within frameworks that do not balance or increase their capabilities relative to 
other groups. Variations in the type of capabilities also determine the character of inter-
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group interaction. In fact, effective links with local groups are critical for VTEs to 
maintain or increase their operational capabilities. Local groups are rooted in the street-
level setting, and as such are less dependent on contact with VTEs in their operations. 
This uneven exchange affects the prospects of cooperation and mutual benefit. The 
balance of interests must favor the local group, or the basis of interaction tends toward 
rivalry. This, too, alters the dynamic of interaction described by the model, resulting in a 
conditional relationship between these two types of groups in particular, rather than 
interactions based on a natural confluence of interests as expected.  
Lastly, local populations play a role in determining the strength and orientation of 
the competitive drive that challenges the state. The violent posture of locally-based 
groups is affected by the disposition of the local populace. When a local population is 
sympathetic or indifferent to the encroachment of an outside group, the degree of 
interaction depends on relative capabilities as noted above. When outside-group 
relationships with the local population decline, the balance of capabilities is 
overshadowed by the reactive profile of the local armed group. Locally-based groups 
tend to act as a force of social conservation and to violently defend community 
perceptions of the status quo. Under circumstances where VTE encroachment is 
perceived as a threat to community interests, rivalry between local armed groups and 
VTEs is more likely than cooperation, regardless of prospects for mutual gain. Further, 
locally-based armed groups maintain a vested interest, through the local population, in 
preserving the structure of the state. This contributes to the imbalance of interests that 
further conditions the interactions between local groups and VTEs. These characteristics 
are summarized in Figures 3-5 below.  
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Figure 4.   Third Generation Gang Model 
 




E. ASSESSMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
The findings of this thesis support the hypotheses proposed in Chapter I. An 
adapted version of the 3G2 model is a more useful way to conceptualize the Sunni-led 
insurgency than the general guidelines currently in use. Those guidelines depict the 
insurgent threat as a discrete collection of actors motivated by a combination of nihilistic 
rage, primordial tribal grievances, or a desire to restore of the former grandeur of the 
Ba’th party. In contrast, the 3G2 model identifies the societal-level conditions affecting 
the origins, development and orientation of armed groups, the political role that these 
groups embrace over time, and the relationships between groups that span the local, 
regional, and global levels of interaction. These factors culminate most forcefully at the 
street-level, where the relationships between groups are characterized by violence and 
competition. The integrated model highlights certain critical junctures where these 
relationships can be altered and exploited to better manage insurgent violence. 
The integrated model shows that insurgent-group activity can be viewed as part of 
the continued effects of the structural forces prevalent in Iraq. The choice to engage in 
violence is one element of a strategic rationale informed by conditions of scarcity and the 
functions armed groups perform locally. This rationale also shapes the competitive 
dynamic that drives the expansion of insurgent groups into the political and economic 
realms. Therefore, the behavior of locally-based armed groups can be affected by 
manipulating societal and local-level factors, the most significant of which are state-level 
economic conditions, the openness of the legitimate political sphere, and the effects of 
entrepreneurial competition. The capabilities of insurgent groups can be significantly 
reduced by focused efforts in these key areas. Resolving critical shortages and 
introducing balanced state-led reforms in the formal sector will slow or reverse the 
growth of the informal and shadow economies. These measures would significantly 
undercut street-level mobilization structures by co-opting the functions of tribal and sub-
tribal groups, while diminishing the pull of the shadow economy which fuels insurgent 
activity. Openness at the political level would similarly undercut or co-opt the rising 
political stature of armed leaders by channeling them into a legitimate political process.  
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These two measures identify and target vulnerabilities in the mobilization 
structures of insurgent groups, and the last exploits vulnerabilities from within the groups 
themselves. These vulnerabilities are produced by the stresses associated with rivalry and 
expansion. By indirectly engaging armed groups through intelligence and infiltration, the 
competitive dynamic that is driving violence and rivalry works to the benefit of the state. 
Expanding groups are particularly vulnerable to this type of enforcement, since their 
expanding capabilities also entail an increased need for resources such as physical 
infrastructure. These assets can be identified and exploited by COIN forces. Meanwhile, 
intra-group conflict over resources increases the group’s exposure to infiltration and 
collaboration with the authorities.  
The research in this thesis also supports the second hypothesis from Chapter I. 
The 3G2 model is a functional representation of the evolving GWOT environment and is 
a useful conceptual tool for strategic planners. The GWOT remains imprecisely bounded 
in terms of concrete, measurable objectives and projected end-states. The main objective 
at this stage is to limit the activities of terrorist groups to an acceptable threshold of 
violence. The interim strategy for accomplishing this task is comparatively well-defined. 
It focuses on limiting the capabilities of terrorist groups by constraining their movements 
and engaging them in their local setting. The model complements this focus by 
emphasizing local-level enablers as the strategic locus within a complex web of 
interconnected actors. The utility of the 3G2 model as a conceptual tool within the 
specific context of Iraq has been clearly demonstrated. The model remains applicable 
within the wider GWOT setting, as the basic units of analysis (networked criminal 
actors), crucial linking mechanisms (markets), logic of interaction (competition), and 
language of exchange (violence) are uniform across contexts. Success in limiting the 
capabilities of terrorist groups is largely contingent upon the disposition of local-level 
actors. This does not obscure the influence of interaction with transnational groups 
positioned within the broader conflict environment, a fact the model recognizes as a 
linking mechanism. However, the model appreciates the constraints and vulnerabilities 
confronting such groups when active at the regional and sub-state levels. 
I have also shown how these trends in insurgent behavior are likely to affect 
developments in Iraq. First, the tendency of insurgent groups to capture sectors of the 
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growing informal and criminal economies will increase. This, in combination with the 
growing political stature of armed groups and an economically liberalizing Iraqi state 
favors some type of criminal enclave or quasi-state development parallel to legitimate 
state-structures. Second, armed groups will function as the shadow or de facto 
governments within these enclaves, providing services and performing tasks reflecting 
this local-orientation. Third, the structure of the legitimate Iraqi state will survive and 
may even thrive in those areas outside of insurgent influence. Fourth, coalition pressure 
will facilitate and increase the rate of these processes. Lastly, the conditions that can slow 
or reverse this progression are state-led structural modifications, the forging of elite 
consensus, and the indirect engagement of insurgent groups. Locally-oriented armed 
groups can be expected to expand from the street to the sub-national level, evolving from 
mutually protective solidarity groups into prominent political and economic actors. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this thesis, I have identified a cross section of the most prominent types of 
violent actors now engaged in Iraq. I have discussed the mechanisms that have propelled 
them into significance, the relationships that structure their choices, and the likely 
trajectories for group development over time. Each represents a balance of inputs that can 
be reconfigured to affect the domain of expected outcomes. The following section 
considers those inputs most likely to diminish insurgent capabilities, formulated as 
policy-oriented recommendations.  
1. Aggressively Target Informal and Criminal Sector Growth 
At present, approximately eighty percent of the Iraqi labor force is engaged 
informally, accounting for more than sixty-five percent of Iraq’s gross national 
product.273 The uncertainties of the post-invasion climate in conjunction with the 
economic stance of the new government are propelling greater numbers of Iraqis into the 
informal realm. This movement is significant because first, the informal and criminal 
sectors are easily captured by combatants, providing a resource base for sustained 
operations. Second, informal sector growth strengthens the relationships between locally-
oriented insurgent groups and the population. Informal entrepreneurs rely on local groups 
                                                 
273 Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Informal Economy,” (Arlington, VA: Report for CENTRA Technology, 
Inc., March 2005), 41. 
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for protection, mediation in the absence of formal regulatory bodies, and access to critical 
resources through the criminal sector. These and other functions that armed groups 
perform locally guarantee the support of local populations. This support is a crucial 
component of insurgent mobilization capacity.  
In order to constrain growth in the criminal sector, critical shortages must be 
addressed. Criminal economies pose substantial challenges even in societies with 
advanced, expanding formal sectors. However, the scarcity that drives aspects of the 
shadow economy in Iraq can be addressed at the level of basic goods and services. 
Previous sections have demonstrated how the black markets for fuel and food rations are 
contributing to insurgent activity. Alleviating these and other critical shortfalls will 
diminish the pull of the criminal economy and, most importantly, resolve the material 
causes for conflict between local groups.  
Informal sector growth can be impeded and eventually reversed by targeted state-
led structural modifications. To do this, some aspects of the neo-liberal posture adopted 
by the Iraqi government must be altered. The drive to promote a stable, healthy free-
market economy is in some ways unsuited to the process of reconstruction. Perhaps 
counter intuitively, the current free-market arrangement is contributing to the strength 
and resiliency of insurgent actors by consolidating their local position as described above. 
This tendency is reversible through a measured state-based development program. Under 
this model, social services and state-initiated development driven by an expanding public 
sector provide employment and benefits, and strong regulatory institutions decrease 
uncertainty. The primary impetuses to join the informal sector are diminished, thus 
constraining informal sector growth in the near term. While this approach may be 
unsuited to robust, long term economic growth, the near-term potential of thriving 
combat economies will, if left unaddressed, lead to much worse long-term outcomes than 
a bloated bureaucracy and inefficient public sector. A focused, state-led program serves 
the dual purpose of weakening ties between the population and local centers of power and 
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reestablishing ties to the central state. This approach strikes a critical vulnerability of the 
insurgent mobilization structure while simultaneously strengthening the formal sector.274 
2.  Lower the Barriers for Entry into the Political Process 
There are substantial barriers to entry into the legitimate political sphere that 
contribute to the perpetuation of insurgent violence. First, the Shiite gatekeepers of the 
new political establishment are reluctant to initiate negotiations with the predominantly 
Sunni insurgent groups. Because these groups represent the erstwhile tormentors of the 
Shiite minority, much of the Shiite elite are unwilling to risk a repeat scenario of Sunni 
consolidation once in government. The tendency of Sunni Islamic extremist groups to 
target Shiite civilians and holy sites adds to this climate of reluctance by making it 
politically difficult for Shiite leaders to appear unsympathetic to their communal support 
base. Second, if Shiites were inclined to initiate negotiations with insurgent groups, it is 
unclear that a negotiating partner exists in a position to guarantee compliance with 
agreements, or even representing an appreciable faction of the disaffected minority. 
Insurgent groups are widely dispersed and lack central direction, and the fractures and 
rivalries among the most dominant groups suggest that a coherent, unified movement is 
not likely to develop under current conditions. The actions of the Islamic Army of Iraq 
and the Army of the Mujahideen illustrate this tendency. Both groups reportedly initiated 
contact with the Shiite government in early 2005, but represent only a small portion of 
the insurgent continuum.   
The process of political inclusion is impeded since the Shiite government is 
unwilling or unable to initiate negotiations. Lacking a mechanism to negotiate with an 
identifiable source, the prospective negotiating partners must initiate contact in either 
case. These barriers can be reduced through a system of targeted incentives. Conditional 
amnesties, equitable power-sharing arrangements, guarantees for petroleum access, and 
other social and political bargains are necessary to deflate the essential grievances that 
inspire insurgent recruitment.  Incentives are based on the assumption that the Sunni 
minority will eventually claim its proper share of the legitimate political sphere. 
                                                 
274 For a more detailed description of this process, see Robert Looney, “The Viability of Economic 
Shock Therapy in Iraq,” Challenge, 47:5 (September-October 2004); Robert Looney, “The Neoliberal 
Model’s Planned Role in Iraq’s Economic Transformation,” Middle East Journal (Autumn, 2003), and 
Robert Looney, “Postwar Iraq’s Financial System,” Middle East Policy, XII:1 (Spring 2005). 
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Incentives facilitate this process by offering a stable, institutionalized venue for inclusion 
in as short a timeframe as possible. The longer this venue is denied, the longer the 
insurgent campaign of anti-system violence will persist. In the absence of inclusion, the 
political prominence of local armed groups is expanded. This expansion corresponds to 
greater mobilization capacity, increasing levels of violence. Escalations in violence result 
in greater polarization and elite fragmentation, decreasing political inclusion. This cycle 
is broken when insurgent groups acquire enough political prominence through force of 
arms to break into the legitimate political sphere. A generous incentives system will 
lower barriers to entry and facilitate the process of political inclusion in the near-term. In 
this way, insurgent group mobilization capacity is diminished while simultaneously 
strengthening the legitimate political establishment.    
3.  Augment Conventional Military Forces with Police-led Domestic 
Intelligence   
The integrated model developed in this study reveals that coalition forces are 
actually contributing to levels of violence in Iraq, rather than inhibiting them as intended. 
Primarily, coalition forces are misreading the competitive dynamic that drives events at 
the street-level, and this has obscured their role in perpetuating the very conditions they 
seek to change. By engaging insurgent groups directly, coalition forces are adding 
momentum to a process of retributive violence. The model of street-level mobilization 
discussed in this study shows that interaction between groups is guided by a competitive 
framework. Within this framework, direct armed confrontation equates to encroachment 
by a rival street-level group. When resources or organizational survival are directly 
threatened by encroachment, the stakes of competition are raised and the degree of 
violence increases. Pressure from sustained confrontation yields decentralization and 
instability that also increase levels of violence. Secondly, the employment of the cordon-
and-search as the specific type of confrontation is also counterproductive. Perceptions 
among indigenous Iraqis of arbitrary detentions, searches, property damage and seizures 
that accompany the use of this tactic are detrimental to coalition efforts. The effects of 
negative interactions with the local population outweigh the advantages of rapid, 
decisive, and overwhelming tactical victories. The strategic goal of denying armed 
groups critical local havens is impeded. 
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In general terms, counterinsurgency strategy has tended to “mirror275” the 
qualities of insurgent movements over time. The current use of a conventional military in 
this unconventional role is unsupported by counterinsurgency strategy, and is 
contributing to insurgent violence. In order to resolve this tension, the central role of 
conventional military units in counterforce targeting must be substituted by police-led 
domestic intelligence capabilities. Small units and Special Forces are then employed in a 
supporting role, with conventional forces backfilling day-to-day police work where 
appropriate. This approach corresponds to the competitive dynamic that is shaping 
insurgent behavior. I have shown in earlier sections how the intelligence/law-
enforcement paradigm capitalizes on the local-level competitive process. Through 
intelligence, infiltration, and policing, COIN forces are well positioned to exploit the 
vulnerabilities that arise from sustained competition. These capabilities are also needed to 
disrupt connectivity between insurgent groups, especially across international boundaries. 
These links are an essential component of insurgent mobilization capacity, and 
conventional forces are ill-equipped to assess patterns of interaction at this level.  
The reliance on conventional capabilities at this stage is in some ways 
unavoidable, due to the underdeveloped state of indigenous law-enforcement resources. 
Now is the time to build the domestic intelligence and police infrastructure. The renewed 
emphasis on diverting resources to the creation of commando-style units is misplaced; 
these units directly target and engage insurgent groups, thus contributing to the 
competitive dynamic that will yield an increase in the level of violence. Police-led 
intelligence efforts benefit from the competitive drive. Through infiltration and 
collaboration, internal vulnerabilities and links between groups can be compromised, 
constraining insurgent mobilization capacity. 
G. AREAS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY 
The outcomes projected in this study reflect assessments based at least partly on 
limited or inadequate information. Specific information regarding the internal dynamics 
of insurgent groups and inter-group relationships is clearly difficult to obtain by second-
hand observation. However, important trends are discernable which indicate why these 
groups continue to draw local recruits, how they gain in political stature, how they are 
                                                 
275 Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies (London: Routledge, 2001), vii. 
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organized, and how they mobilize to sustain operations. Further inquiry is warranted to 
determine relevant trends in insurgent behavior and how to minimize the effects of 
insurgent violence in a timely and appropriate manner.  
Specifically, research is needed to determine how patterns of distribution and 
scarcity have changed under the Shiite government, and how this has affected the 
informal and shadow economies. How are the leaders of armed groups translating 
military power into political authority? How are these structures of authority employed 
locally, what is the relationship between local armed groups and ethnically mixed 
populations? Further, how violence has affected the ethnic identities and prospects for 
coexistence deserves attention. How are emerging trends in ethnic and communal 
violence affecting the competitive dynamic among Sunni-groups and how do trends in 
domestic and international support for the insurgent groups, especially VTEs, affect 
insurgent behavior? More broadly, further inquiry is needed to assess how the Sunni-led 
insurgency alters official conceptions of U.S. capabilities in the wider GWOT 
environment. Lastly, the integrated 3G2 model requires further testing in other difficult 
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